Post Claim Underwriting by Cady, Thomas C. & Gates, Georgia Lee
Volume 102 Issue 4 Article 5 
June 2000 
Post Claim Underwriting 
Thomas C. Cady 
West Virginia University College of Law 
Georgia Lee Gates 
West Virginia University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Contracts Commons, and the Insurance Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Thomas C. Cady & Georgia L. Gates, Post Claim Underwriting, 102 W. Va. L. Rev. (2000). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol102/iss4/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @ 
WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research 




I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 810
II. POST CLAIM UNDERWRITING DEFINED AND IDENTIFIED ............ 812
A. Post Claim Underwriting Defined ................................ 812
B. Post Claim Underwriting Identified ............................. 813
III. POLICY ARGUMENTS .................................................................. 814
A. General Policy Principles ............................................. 814
B. The Aleatory Contract .................................................. 817
C. Low-Loss Ratios of Credit Insurance ........................... 819
D. Great Potential for Abuse ............................................. 821
F. The Insurer's Marketing Choice ................................... 823
G. Patently Unfair ............................................................. 824
H . Redux ............................................................................ 825
IV. POST CLAIM UNDERWRITING AS PER SE BAD FAITH .................. 826
A. Opportunism and Bad Faith ......................................... 826
1. Opportunism .................................................... 826
2. Bad Faith ......................................................... 827-
a. Post Claim Underwriting and the
Gruenberg Model ............................... 829
b. Post Claim Underwriting and the
Anderson Model ................................ 831
B. Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 172
Forecloses an Insurer Engaged in Post Claim
Underwriting from Asserting the Inception
Defense of Misrepresentation ....................................... 832
C. Punitive Damages ......................................................... 833
V. PRIOR CASES OF POST CLAIM UNDERWRITING DECIDED UPON
ALTERNATIVE THEORIES ............................................................ 838
A. W aiver ........................................................................... 839
B. Estoppel ........................................................................ 840
C. Unconscionability ......................................................... 841
Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law. B.A., Rice University; LL.B., Uni-
versity of Texas; LL.M., Georgetown University.
Member, Class of 2000, Associate Editor of Student Works, West Virginia Law Review.
1
Cady and Gates: Post Claim Underwriting
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2000
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
D. Reasonable Expectations .............................................. 843
E. Cause of Action for Statutory Unfair Claims
Settlement Practices ...................................................... 846
F. Insurer Fraud ................................................................ 847
G. Misstatements on Application Prepared by Agent ........ 848
H . Incontestability ............................................................. 850
L R edux ............................................................................ 853
VI. ARGUMENTS CONTRA - THE LIAR, THE CUNNING FRAUD,
AND THE INNOCENT MIS-INFORMER ........................................... 854
A . The Cases ...................................................................... 854
1. Richison v. Boatmen's Arkansas, Inc .............. 854
2. Brandt v. Time Insurance Co .......................... 857
3. Wesley v. Union National Life ........................ 858
4. R edux .............................................................. 861
B. The Literature ............................................................... 863
1. G oogins ........................................................... 863
2. R edux .............................................................. 868
V II. CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 868
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article confronts the bane of many an insured: post claim underwrit-
ing. It is an underwriting abomination. It is an artificial vehicle for contract avoid-
ance. It is quintessentially opportunistic.
Post claim underwriting facilitates issuance of an insurance policy by in-
surers, without prior determination of risk. Underwriting is postponed until a claim
has been filed. An investigation and assessment of the risk presented by the insured
is commenced only after the insurer is confronted with the prospect of contract
performance. With the specter of contract performance looming on the horizon, the
insurer has new-found energy for investigation. It then marshals its resources to
discover any historical minutiae related to the insured that might serve as an argu-
able basis for an inception defense. Once this minutia is discovered, rescission
naturally follows.
This Article posits that insurers are obligated to perform pre-issuance un-
derwriting. The natural corollary to that postulate is also asserted: post claim un-
derwriting is a forbidden practice. The premise of the "forbidden practice" rests
upon the reasoned conclusion that post claim underwriting is a vehicle for oppor-
tunism in the insurance relationship. It is opportunistic because it permits the in-
surer to take advantage of the insured's vulnerabilities created by the sequential
character of the insurance contract through a post hoc rationale for rescission.' In
this regard, there is also a proposal for a per se rule of bad faith prohibiting post
claim underwriting. Only through such a rule can the post claim underwriting bane
be efficiently and forcefully deterred.
The Article is divided into five substantive categories of discussion, com-
See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.1 (5th ed. 1998).
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POST CLAIM UNDERWRITING
mencing with Part II and ending with Part VI. Part II consists of a compendium of
court opinions (most notably the Mississippi Supreme Court) gathered to both de-
fine post claim underwriting and contrast it with the standard industry practice of
pre-issuance underwriting. This definitional section is followed by a presentation of
typology that should afford adequate factual information to allow counsel to readily
identify cases of post claim underwriting.
Part m of the Article commences with a discussion of case law directly
addressing post claim underwriting, followed by a presentation of general policy
principles of both contract and insurance law that necessarily overarch any delib-
erative process in the insurance context. Part III then sets forth five specific policy
rationales for condemnation of the practice of post claim underwriting. First, it is
established that post claim underwriting is a purposeful insurer practice designed to
defeat the odds of the aleatory contract of insurance. Second is a discussion of the
high profitability made possible by the low loss-ratios of credit insurance - a line of
coverage frequently associated with the practice of post claim underwriting. The
third topic of discussion, "Great Potential for Abuse," once again relies upon sales
practices associated with credit insurance to demonstrate that the remunerative
process associated with the line, when coupled with the practice of post claim un-
derwriting, renders the insured particularly vulnerable to insurer abuse. Next is a
discussion of "The Insurer's Marketing Choice." This subsection sets forth the
proposition that an insurer's marketing choice to forego reasonably thorough un-
derwriting leaves it responsible for any adverse selection of risk it may subse-
quently encounter. Finally, in "Patently Unfair," the inherent unfairness of post
claim underwriting is examined.
Part IV posits the per se rule of bad faith that is the impetus for the Article.
It is first established that post claim underwriting, as a practice, irrespective of any
individualized case study, satisfies both the Gruenberg2 and Anderson3 models of
bad faith. Next it is postulated that because post claim underwriting constitutes bad
faith, as defined by GruenberglAnderson, any insurer engaged in the practice is
foreclosed from asserting an inception defense, regardless of the nature of any al-
leged misrepresentation. As a consequence, the insurer cannot rescind the policy.
This postulate is supported by a discussion of the reasoning of Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts Section 172. Part V is finally rounded-out with a discussion of
damages, which should prove to be of particular interest to the practitioner.
Part V consists of a survey of cases representative of post claim underwrit-
ing but decided on alternative doctrines available for piftection of the insured. It is
demonstrated that although these doctrines have commendably protected insureds
from insurer abuse on an ad hoc basis, the doctrines cannot adequately deter post
claim underwriting as a bad faith practice.
Finally, Part VI rebuts the contrary argument to the creation of a per se
rule of bad faith. In "The Liar, The Cunning Fraud, and The Innocent Mis-
Informer," it is argued that before a court addresses any alleged misrepresentation
by the insured it must first look to the nature of the insurer's pre-issuance under-
2 Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1979).
3 Anderson v. Continental Cas. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978).
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writing so as to determine fully the true nature of the risk embraced by the insurer.
If that assessment reveals a marketing choice to "insure the world" then the insurer
must live with its consequences. The insurer cannot be permitted to withdraw from
that pre-issuance marketing decision even when it means embracing the cunning
fraud. Any other conclusion wrongly places the mark of judicial imprimatur upon a
decidedly opportunistic practice that sweeps the innocent insured within its ambit.
II. POST CLAIM UNDERWRITING DEFINED AND IDENTIFIED
A. Post Claim Underwriting Defined
Every second or third year law student comes to learn that the genesis of
underwriting is found in Lloyd's Coffee House, Tower Street, London. Lloyd's, in
the seventeenth century, was a popular establishment frequented by shippers and
merchants of international goods who, in the course of imbibing the brew of
roasted beans, created the basic precepts of the modem insurance business. One
seeking to insure a vessel or cargo would present himself at Lloyd's and circulate
among the coffee house patrons with a written description of vessel, cargo, captain,
crew, navigational route, and the desired amount of insurance coverage needed for
the voyage.4 Thus, any Lloyd's patron interested in pursuing the "business of in-
surance" would assess the risk associated with individual voyages by evaluating its
relevant statistics (ship, cargo, captain, crew, and destination) listed at the top of the
circulated piece of paper. After making this assessment, if the risk were found to be
an acceptable one, the individual insurer would write his name and the amount of
money for which he was willing to undertake liability for any loss that might occur
"under" the description on the piece of paper circulated - hence the term "under-
writing.
' 5
We begin our discussion of post claim underwriting with this short ety-
mology not to engage in a study of the historic roots of insurance law, but to re-
mind the reader that "underwriting" is a risk assessment conducted pre-issuance
and pre-loss. Obviously, this sequence is necessary to allow the insurer to ascertain
the probability of its incurring liability for any loss that the insured might sustain
and, therefore, whether it wishes to assume the risk of that loss. In addition, by
determining the likelihood of any future loss, the insurer is able to set an appropri-
ate premium amount for the applied for coverage.
Concomitantly, the traditional sequence of underwriting enables the in-
sured to determine whether the cost of the risk aversion offered is sufficiently eco-
nomical to induce the purchase of insurance. In addition, if the insurance is pur-
chased, the insured can rest easy in the knowledge that in the event of a loss there
will be coverage. Therefore, the traditional sequence of underwriting naturally
gives rise to a judicial mandate that "an insurer has an obligation to its insureds to
do its underwriting at the time a policy application is made, not after a claim is
ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 11, at 18 (2d ed. 1996).
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Post claim underwriting, however, creates a process that is a complete in-
version of the established sequence of underwriting. When an insurer engages in
post claim underwriting, it "wait[s] until a claim has been filed to obtain informa-
tion and make underwriting decisions which should have been made when the ap-
plication [for insurance] was made, not after the policy was issued.",7 In other
words, the insurer does not assess an insured's eligibility for insurance, according
to the risk he presents, until after insurance has been purchased and a claim has
been made.8 Although the insurer may ask an applicant for some underwriting in-
formation before it issues the policy, it will not follow up on that information until
after a significant claim arises. Only after a claim has arisen will the insurer exam-
ine the application and request additional information to see whether the applicant
could have been excluded from coverage.9
An insurer relying upon post claim underwriting, "instead of looking to
pay the claim [for the loss incurred by the insured as promised under the terms of
the insurance contract] look[s] for all the things in the application that [it] might be
able to dig up... to rescind the policy."' Thus, the "insurer, rather than refusing
to write a policy [as a bad risk] will wait until after a claim is filed to deny cover-
age on grounds that the policy should not have been written in the first place."" In
so doing, the insurer abrogates its obligation, as established at Lloyd's three centu-
ries ago, to do its underwriting at the time a policy application is made in favor of
conducting its risk assessment after claims are submitted. The insurer implements
this post hoc evaluation so that it might rid itself of insureds12 for whom insurance
coverage never should have been underwritten in the first place.'
3
B. Post Claim Underwriting Identified
Alert counsel can easily identify the typical post claim underwriting case.
The most obvious factual element presented is that rather than being processed
through the claims department of the insurer, the insured's claim is submitted to the
underwriting department. The underwriting department then typically either re-
quests a release for past medical records or simply forwards a release, obtained at
6 Lewis v. Equity Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 637 So. 2d 183, 188-89 (Miss. 1994).
7 Id. at 186.
8 Wesley v. Union Nat'l Life, 919 F. Supp. 232, 235 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (explaining the Mississippi
Supreme Court's definition of Post Claims Underwriting in Lewis).
9 Meyer v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 500 N.W.2d 150,153 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). Note that the
Meyer Court utilizes the synonym of "Retroactive Underwriting" instead of the term "post claim underwrit-
ing."
10 Ingalls v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Group, 561 N.W.2d 273, 285 (N.D. 1997).
11 Dixie Ins. Co. v. Mooneyhan, 684 So. 2d 574,589 (Miss. 1996) (McRae, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
12 Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co. v. James, 506 S.E.2d 892, 894 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
13 Mooneyhan, 684 So. 2d at 589.
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the time of application, requesting the same. After the underwriting department
culls through the requested medical records, an inconsistency or omission in the
application is identified. The insurer then denies coverage for the claim on the basis
of an inception defense, such as misrepresentation, concealment or fraud. The in-
sured, subsequently, is advised that the policy has been rescinded and that there is
no coverage for the loss. All premiums paid to date then are returned.
The process of application for insurance also provides clues that an insurer
is engaged in the practice of post claim underwriting. Typically the questionnaire is
simplified. The insurer may ask only whether the insured is in "good health" or
may make no health inquiries at all. If health-related questions are on the applica-
tion, they are generally broad based and subject to interpretation - requiring the
insured to check a box with yes or no. Although the form also may request the
names of treating physicians, the insurer engaged in post claim underwriting will
not follow-up on the information provided until after a claim is filed. In other
words, no proper underwriting investigation will be completed until after a claim.
The policy is issued immediately upon application and the payment of a premium.
No medical examination is requested.
Counsel will also note an extensive delay between the filing of the claim
and the notice of rescission of the policy. This delay occurs because the insurer is
performing its underwriting, in essence, "padding the file." The acquisition of
medical records and their assessment will take weeks or months. For example, in
one reported case the time between the insurer's receipt of a medical insurance
claim and rescission of the policy was eight and one half months.
14
Finally, it should be noted that the practice of post claim underwriting is
most prevalent in the group insurance context, particularly credit insurance and
medical insurance. Any time a policy is rescinded for a misrepresentation in these
lines, counsel should be alert to the possibility that a post claim underwriting case
has been presented.
III. POLICY ARGUMENTS
A. General Policy Principles
In the course of the past two decades a number of courts, most notably the
Mississippi Supreme Court, have condemned the practice of post claim underwrit-
ing as either fraudulent and illegal or as a bad faith settlement practice.1 5 The Mis-
14 See Lewis v. Equity Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 637 So. 2d 183, 184 (Miss. 1994).
15 White v. Continental Gen. Ins. Co., 831 F. Supp. 1545, 1155-56 (D. Wyo. 1993) (stating that
insured made out claim of bad faith by insurer by presenting evidence of post claim underwriting); James,
506 S.E.2d at 894-95 (post claim underwriting as basis for tort claim of fraud); Nassen v. National States Ins.
Co., 494 N.W.2d 231, 234-36 (Iowa 1992) (stating that expert testimony that nursing home insurer was en-
gaged in post claim underwriting was admissible to show fraudulent underwriting technique); Gardner v.
League Life Ins., 210 N.W.2d 897, 898 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) (applying doctrine of estoppel to preclude
rescission of credit life and disability insurance policy per post claim underwriting); Meyer v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 500 N.W.2d 150, 154 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that question of whether Blue Cross was
engaging in retroactive, Le., post claim underwriting to avoid paying claims for treatment of AIDS was one
for jury); Mooneyhan, 684 So. 2d at 589-90 (stating that post claim underwriting is clearly not a fair practice;
[Vol. 102:809
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sissippi Supreme Court, in concluding that an insurer's practice of post claim un-
derwriting could support an award of punitive damages for bad faith settlement
practices, employed the following reasoning:
An insurer has an obligation to its insureds to do its underwriting
at the time a policy application is made, not after a claim is filed..
. The insurer controls when the underwriting occurs. It therefore
should be estopped from determining whether to accept an insured
six months or more after a policy is issued. If the insured is not an
acceptable risk, the application should be denied up front, not after
the policy is issued.16
Implicit in the Mississippi Court's reasoning is an affirmation of the utility
of a doctrinal approach that adheres to the traditional sequence of underwriting
established three centuries ago in Lloyd's Coffee House. That sequence requires
the insurer to underwrite after it has completed its risk assessment and before a
claim has been filed. In addition, the Lloyd's sequence of underwriting not only
permits the insurer to ascertain the likelihood of a loss occurrence, but also protects
the reasonable expectation of an insured that he will be covered in the event of a
loss. A judicial mandate that directs an insurer to conform to the traditional se-
quence is, therefore, necessary because an insurer would otherwise be free to cull
through the history of an insured, after a claim has been made, searching for that
inevitable detail of medical history that will yield an "arguable basis" for a post
hoc refusal to underwrite. Thus, absent a judicial doctrine condemning post claim
underwriting as a practice inconsistent with the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in insurance contracts, the insurer would be granted virtually uncon-
trolled discretion to refuse to perform upon the presentation of any claim under a
policy.
insurers should be discouraged from following it); Lewis, 637 So. 2d at 185-89 (stating that insurer was
estopped from determining whether to accept an insured after policy issued pursuant to practice of post claim
underwriting; post claim underwriting may support an award of punitive damages); National Life & Accident
Ins. Co. v. Miller, 484 So. 2d 329, 339 (Miss. 1985) (Hawkins, J., concurring) (stating that with practice of
post claim underwriting punitive damages are appropriate); Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. McGee, 444 So. 2d 803,
811-812 (Miss. 1983) (stating that post claim underwriting provided ample evidence for a jury question as to
whether punitive damages should be awarded); Ingalls v. Paul Revere Life Ins., 561 N.W.2d 273, 284-85
(N.D. 1997) (post claim underwriting as evidence of oppression, fraud or malice for purposes of upholding
award of punitive damages for bad faith settlement practices); U.S. Credit Life Ins. Co. v. McAfee, 630 P.2d
450, 455 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (finding that an insurer must require evidence of insurability before the
insured's death, not after).
16 Lewis, 637 So. 2d at 188-89. The facts of Lewis are enlightening. The policy at issue was an "in-
dividual intensive care policy" that Mrs. Lewis purchased from an Equity National agent on April 18, 1989.
The policy premium for this decidedly limited coverage was $3 per month. The full extent of coverage was
$200 per day of hospitalization in an intensive care unit, only. No other hospitalization coverage was pro-
vided. Th-is was the second policy Mrs. Lewis bought from Equity National. The first was purchased in 1986
at a cost of $13A0 per month and covered only cancer. See id. at 184-85.
After eleven months of premium payments on the intensive care policy, Mrs. Lewis was involved
in an automobile accident that necessitated a one-night stay in the intensive care unit of the hospital. Equity
National denied coverage for that single night; refusing to remit the total policy proceeds of $200. Equity
National claimed that Mrs. Lewis made a material misrepresentation on her application regarding a pre-
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The Mississippi Supreme Court has correctly condemned post claim un-
derwriting as a practice that constitutes a breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. An insurer should not be able to simply "play the odds' 7 by
employing "risky [underwriting] practices .. . [and] flippantly 'absolve' itself [of
liability]"' 8 with a declaration of "Uh Oh!"' 9 - the insured should never have been
issued a policy. If an insurer chose to insure a risk, without expending the neces-
sary resources and time to underwrite before issuance of a policy, it should be held
to the consequences of its unenlightened gamble. Thus, an insured, whose reason-
able expectation of coverage is frustrated by post claim underwriting, should be
entitled to pursue a cause of action against the insurer under a theory of bad faith
settlement practices and seek compensatory damages and, in the appropriate case,
punitive damages, as well. 20 This conclusion is consistent with the overriding pur-
pose of contract law.
"[T]he fundamental function of contract law (and recognized as such at
least since Hobbes's day) is to deter people from behaving opportunistically toward
their contracting parties." 2' Opportunism arises because of the "sequential charac-
ter of [economic] activity.",22 Simply stated, opportunism occurs when one party to
a contract takes advantage of the postponement in fulfilling its promise that is made
possible because the promise to perform precedes actual performance. Insurance
contracts, like most contracts, require sequential performance.
More particularly, the development of judicial doctrines "in insurance
cases is influenced.., by perceptions about the interests of society in the resolution
of the dispute, 23 that has arisen between the insurer and the insured regarding li-
ability for a loss. There is an even greater societal interest in this form of contract
because of the "quasi-public" 24 nature of the insurance
business.25 As such, "the relationship between the insurer and insured [and] the
17 Id. at 188.
18 Id.
19 Michael K. Graves, Comment, Scope of Investigation Required by Health Insurers in Mississippi
Prior to Denial of First-Party Claims, 13 Miss. C. L. REV. 173, 182 (1992).
20 See discussion, infra Part IV.C regarding damages.
21 POSNER, supra note 1, § 4.1, at 103 (footnote omitted).
22 Id.
23 ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 6.4, at 646 (1988).
24 It has long been recognized that the business of insurance is quasi public in character.
The purpose and nature of ... insurance [contracts], and the duties which the insurer
assumes under such contracts, and the manner in which such contracts are negotiated,
impress such contracts and the relationship of the parties, even during negotiations,
with characteristics unlike those incident to contracts and negotiations for contracts in
ordinary commercial transactions.
Barrera v. State Farm MuL Auto. Ins. Co., 456 P.2d 674, 680 n.5 (Cal. 1969).
25 Id. at 681 (Cal. 1969).
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rights and obligations of the insurer cannot be determined solely on the basis of
rules pertaining to private contracts negotiated by individual parties.,
26
As a consequence, a judicially created doctrine in the insurance context
may place the insurer "under a duty entirely irrespective of contract, one which the
law imposes regardless of the company's desire to assume it... a duty peculiar to
the business of insurance."27 As discussed more fully, infra, a judicial doctrine
establishing the practice of post claim underwriting as per se bad faith is fully sup-
ported both by the need to deter opportunism and by the public policy concerns
uniquely related to insurance contracts.
B. The Aleatory Contract
The Mississippi Supreme Court, in its consideration of post claim under-
writing, has infused its opinions with references to the insurer playing the odds.28
The Court likely employed this metaphor because of the aleatory nature of insur-
ance contracts.
The term "aleatory" is derived from the Latin word for gambler: aleator.
29
A contract is aleatory when a party's duty to perform is conditional on the occur-
rence of an event that neither party to the contract is certain will occur.30 In other
words, performance is contingent upon the happening of a fortuitous event.3' In the
context of insurance, this means that the insurer may or may not pay more in bene-
fits than premiums paid.32 Thus, the insured loses the gamble if there is no loss or if
the premiums paid exceed the cost of any loss. Conversely, the insurer loses the
gamble when a loss occurs.
The aleatory nature of insurance contracts makes "the recognition and
identification of risks... an important step"'' in the insurer's decision to provide
coverage for the fortuitous occurrence. "In most circumstances the greater the
awareness and understanding of the . . . facts, the smaller is the role played by
guesswork in estimating the risks because it is possible to make more reliable pre-
dictions. Although total elimination of uncertainty is not possible, management of
risk is an attainable goal."'
26 Id. at 681-82.
27 Id. at 681 n.6 (Cal. 1969).
28 Lewis v. Equity Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 637 So. 2d 183, 188; see also Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co. v.
Williams, 566 So. 2d 1172, 1193 (Miss. 1990); Southern United Life Ins. Co. v. Caves, 481 So. 2d 764 (Miss.
1985); National Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Miller, 484 So. 2d 329, 339 (Miss. 1985) (Hawkins, J., concur-
ring).
29 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 43 (3d ed. 1992).
30 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 76 cmt. C. (1981).
31 Id.
32 BARRON'S DICTIONARY OF INSURANCE TERMs 22 (3d ed. 1995).
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A reasonable insurer attempts, through underwriting, to reduce the role
played by guesswork through an assessment of the risks it agrees to assume. Un-
derwriting, however, requires the insurer to expend monies, up-front, on risk as-
sessment. As a consequence, an insurer engaged in proper underwriting necessarily
reduces the amount of profit realized from premiums collected on the policies it
issues. In addition, proper underwriting screens out unacceptable risks before issu-
ance of a policy. Therefore, the insurer does not realize any premium income from
individuals who present an unacceptable risk because no policy is issued.
An insurer engaged in post claim underwriting, however, does not attempt
to reduce the role played by guesswork in assessing the risks it agrees to assume
before issuance of the policy. Instead, the insurer "issues policies after only super-
ficial [or no] underwriting to realize large amounts of premium income, and then
attempts to deny coverage on the grounds of misrepresentation by engaging in ag-
gressive investigation of the risk after the insured makes a claim."35 In essence, the
insurer attempts to defeat the odds, not through an enlightened gamble premised
upon reliable predictions, but by fixing the odds. The odds are fixed by post claim
underwriting because the practice allows the insurer to transform an uncertain event
- the loss - into an event that is certain. In other words, an insurer engaged in post
claim underwriting seeks to limit its liability for a loss by proclaiming, "Heads I
win, tails you lose." This manipulation of the odds is possible only because of the
postponement in performance occasioned by the sequential character of the insur-
ance contract.36
Thus, by fixing the odds of the aleatory contract it has agreed to enter, the
insurer takes advantage of the insured's vulnerabilities during the delay between its
promise to insure and its contractually obligated performance. 7 As a consequence,
the insurer not only profits from insureds who never file a claim, but also receives
income generated from questionable policies with knowledge that at a later date it
will likely raise inaccuracies in the application as a means of avoiding liability for
the loss for which it has become obligated. 8 Although the insurer will be forced to
rescind the policy and refund the premiums to avoid liability by claiming a misrep-
resentation, it will nonetheless profit from premiums paid by ineligible insureds
who never file a claim, while refusing to pay on the same policies if claims are ever
filed.39 The insured, however, despite the premium refund, has lost both the oppor-
tunity to procure other insurance 4° and the security and peace of mind for which he
35 Franklin D. Cordell, Note, The Private Mortgage Insurer's Action for Rescission for Misrepresen-
tation: Limiting a Potential Threat to Private Sector Participation in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 47
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 587, 598 (1990).
36 See generally POSNER, supra note 1, at § 4.1.
37 See generally id.
38 Cordell, supra note 35, at 598.
39 Kathleen Keest, The Cost of Credit: Regulation and Legal Challenges The National Consumer
Law Center, 936 PLI/CORP. 763, 789 (1996).
40 Lewis v. Equity Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 684 So. 2d 183, 189 (Miss. 1994).
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originally bargained.4' The insurer, thus, by fixing the odds has opportunistically
placed itself in a win-win situation in which the insured is always the loser. There-
fore, post claim underwriting renders the "insured especially vulnerable to oppor-
tunistic behavior on the part of the insurer.
42
The insurer purposefully renders the insured vulnerable by employing the
stratagem of post claim underwriting. That stratagem is employed with the sole
objective of defeating the very essence of the aleatory contract. That essence directs
that one party must necessarily lose "the gamble" on the occurrence or nonoccur-
rence of the fortuitous event. 43
Thus, through post claim underwriting, the insurer fixes the odds to avoid
its obligations in the event of a loss. The result of this manipulation of the odds is
that the insured can never receive the benefit of the contract because the insurer
cannot lose. By contrast, the insurer is guaranteed significant profits through either
its continued premium collection or performance avoidance - both made possible
by post claim underwriting.
C. Low-Loss Ratios of Credit Insurance
Insurers marketing credit insurance frequently rely upon post claim un-
derwriting. Credit insurance is a line of insurance in which exceptionally low loss-
ratios are typically reported. The low-loss ratios associated with credit insurance
reveal that insurers engage in post claim underwriting for the sole purpose of fur-
ther expanding an already corpulent profit margin.
44
The loss-ratio of an insurance line is found by computing the percentage of
each premium dollar "paid out" to insureds in claims benefits.45 Insurance is a
"good buy" for an insured if the low-loss ratio is "high" because it indicates that
"most of the premium dollar is spent for the benefit of the insureds." 4 By contrast,
the lower the loss-ratio the more overpriced the insurance and the greater the profit
for the insurer.
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners recommends that
insurers have a minimum loss-ratio of 60%. 47 The typical loss-ratio for credit life
41 Graves, supra note 19, at 174.
42 Bob Works, Excusing Nonoccurrence of Insurance Policy Conditions in Order to Avoid Dispro-
portionate Forfeiture: Claims-Made Formats as a Test Case, 5 CONN. INS. L. J. 505, 570 (1999). Professor
Works defines "the potential for opportunism," as "the risk that 'human agents will not reliably self-enforce
promises but will defect from the letter and spirit of an agreement when it suits their purposes."' Id. at 552
n.95.
See RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF CONTRACrS §§ 76,226.
44 The loss ratio nationwide for credit involuntary unemployment insurance was 12.6% in 1997 (the
most recent year for which figures are available); for credit property insurance, 26.3%; for credit life, 41.6%;
and for credit disability insurance, 48.6%. What Price Insurance? CONSUMER REPORTS, July 1999, at 6.
45 Keest, supra note 39, at 779.
46 Id.
47 Id. A loss-ratio as low as 50% may, however, be acceptable in credit insurance policies. See, e.g.,
114 W.V.C.S.R. 114-6-1 (stating a loss-ratio of 50% is acceptable for credit policies subject to the Insurance
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insurance - the line of group insurance most frequently associated with the practice
of post claim underwriting in reported opinions
48 - is 41.6%49
An Alabama case reported gross statewide premium earnings from credit
insurance of nearly $40 million by one insurer.50 The court also included within its
opinion the loss-ratios calculated on the insurance sold through a single lending
institution by the insurer from 1988 to 1991.5' Those ratios for the four accounted
years were 20.6%, 21.1%, 16.3% and 17.0%, respectively. 2 Incredibly, in some
states, reported loss-ratios on credit life insurance are as low as 10% or 15%;53 "in
some years some lines dip into the single digits."'
Although credit insurance may be written as an individual policy, the
debtor is more likely to be enrolled in a group policy issued to the creditor by the
insurer.55 Because the creditor is responsible for seeking applicants and completing
the application process "[g]roup insurance has administrative economies which
should make it cheaper than individual policies, as there is less administrative work
for the insurer."' 56 The reduced administrative cost of group policies, coupled with
the low loss-ratios associated with credit life insurance, suggests little need for an
insurer to further reduce its costs by declining to complete its underwriting before
issuance of a policy.5 7 Therefore, there can be little doubt that the primary purpose
Commissioner's approval before issuance).
48 See Union Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Crocker, 667 So. 2d 688 (Ala. 1995), vacated and remanded by
BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). On rehearing, the Alabama Supreme Court recalcu-
lated the award of punitive damages in conformance Gore. See Union Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Crocker, 709
So.2d 1118 (Ala. 1997). See also Richison v. Boatmen's Arkansas, Inc. (Ark. Ct. App. 1998); Gardner v.
League Life Ins., 210 N.W.2d 897 (Mich. 1973); Gulf Guar. Life Ins. Co. v. Duett, 671 So. 2d 1305 (Miss.
1996); Southern United Life Ins. Co. v. Caves, 481 So. 2d 764 (Miss. 1985); Barber v. Balboa Life Ins. Co.,
No. 97-CA-003420COA, 1999 WL 228121 (Miss. Ct. App. April 20, 1999); USLife Credit Life Ins. Co. v.
McAfee, 630 P.2d 450 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981).
49 What Price Insurance?, supra note 44, at 6.
50 Crocker, 667 So. 2d at 693.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Albert B. Crenshaw, Credit hIsurance Costs Are Often Excessive, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 14,
1999, at H01.
Id.
55 Keest, supra note 39, at 776-77.
56 Id. at 777.
57 In Gardner v. League Life Ins. Co., the Michigan Court of Appeals opined that "post-claim un-
derwriting [was] a legitimate vehicle to diminish the cost of insurance." 210 N.W.2d 897, 898 (Mich. CL
App. 1973). The court, however, noting that its equity conscience was aroused, also observed that "[tihe
injustice of informing a disabled borrower at the time the claim is filed that he has no insurance protection is
obvious and the need for notice is beyond peradventure." Id. The court ultimately held that the insurer was
"estopped from denying liability for its failure to provide plaintiff with notice of the policy and exclusionary
provisions." Id. at 899.
There is, however, no indication in the Gardner opinion that the court was provided with evidence
of the high profitability and low-loss ratios of credit insurance before concluding that "post-claim underwrit-
12
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for post claim underwriting, at least in the credit insurance context, is the mainte-
nance of corpulent profit margins.
D. Great Potential for Abuse
The remunerative processes employed in the credit insurance industry cre-
ate a great potential for abuse, especially when insurers are permitted to rely upon
post claim underwriting as a vehicle to accomplish rescission. "[C]onsumers spend
as much as $6 billion per year on credit insurance."5 8 The low loss-ratios associ-
ated with credit life insurance, discussed supra, demonstrate that it is an extremely
profitable business endeavor for the insurer. It is, however, nearly as profitable for
the lender because the "creditor receives significant compensation from the sale of
insurance from the insurer whose product they sell." 9
"[T]he lender receives commissions at a specified percentage of each pre-
mium dollar, sometimes as much as 40%-50%."60 "In addition to commissions,
creditors may receive compensation in other forms.",6' The lender may be paid
dividends or retrospective rate credits by the insurer, "if the insurer has a favorable
claims experience." 62 A lender's profits from insurance sales "can even exceed the
profits... from [its] credit business." 63 Finally, a creditor's "individual employees
may receive some form of incentive or bonuses based on their insurance sales, thus
giving an individual loan officer economic pressures to sell insurance which are
personal, as well as institutional." 64 The high profit available from the sale of in-
surance, created by bonus, profit-sharing and commission plans, combined with the
practice of post claim underwriting, yields a high potential for abuse arising from
agents filing false applications.
Some jurists have directly addressed this great potential for abuse.65 One
concurrence observed, after first noting that the soliciting agent's sole source of
income from the insurer was earned on commission and that the commission was
ing is a legitimate vehicle for diminishing the cost of insurance." Id. Given that the court's equity conscience
was amused on the issue of notice to a disabled worker, it is likely that the court, had it been aware of the
exorbitant profits enjoyed by insurers marketing credit insurance, would not have been inclined to offer its
opinion that post-claim underwriting is a legitimate vehicle for diminishing the cost of insurance.
58 What Price Insurance?, supra note 44, at 6.




63 Id at 778.
64 Keest, supra note 39, at 777.
65 For excellent and detailed discussions of factual allegations demonstrating the temptation faced by
insurance agents in accurately reporting the health history of applicants for credit life insurance see National
Life & Accident Ins. Co. v.. Miller 484 So. 2d 329, 339 (Miss. 1985) (Hawkins, J., concurring); Union Sec.
Life Ins. Co. v. Crocker, 667 So. 2d 688 (Ala. 1995), vacated and remanded by BMW of North America v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). On rehearing, the Alabama Supreme Court recalculated the award of punitive
damages in conformance Gore. See Union Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Crocker, 709 So.2d 1118 (Ala. 1997).
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not earned absent the issuance of a policy, that:
When the soliciting agent, rather than the applicant fills in
the application, it is naive to assume there is not a strong tempta-
tion on his part to ignore an answer the applicant gives which
would prevent the company's issuing a policy, which would
"knock out" a sale....
... The insurance companies surely know this. Yet, they permit
their agents to be put in such conflict of interest positions, only to
assert later, with a presumably straight face, that [the applicant
made material misrepresentations in the application and, therefore,
there is no coverage] ....
... It would be quite simple to remove from the agent any respon-
sibility or authority to fill in the application form. The question
then follows, why don't insurance companies do so? ....
... The answer, for insurance companies such as this [one] is not
savory....
... [The insurer can] play the odds with its practice of encourag-
ing agents to submit false applications and then... deny a claim
because the application [is] false.
66
Thus, because an agent and lending institution are not remunerated unless a policy
is issued, a system has been created that encourages agents to give false answers on
insurance application forms. The insurer then relies upon "the deceit of [its] own
agents as a weapon to deny a claim" by asserting a material misrepresentation and
seeking rescission of the policy.
67
A system of incentives that encourages insurer abuse is not, however, lim-
ited to the application process. The United States District Court for Wyoming de-
scribed a bonus plan applied directly to post claim underwriting.
Every... underwriter is required to amass 100 points per day in
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order to keep their job. 2.5 points are awarded if an underwriter ei-
ther pays or denies a claim; however, 5 points are awarded if the
underwriter can find a pre-existing condition that would enable
[the insurer] to deny coverage.6
The application of such incentive programs directly to post claim underwriting is
indicative of a deliberate choice by the insurer to unreasonably defer its underwrit-
ing decision" for the sole purpose of increasing its profits through avoidance of its
contractual obligation to perform in the event of an insured's loss.
F. The Insurer's Marketing Choice
In analyzing an applicant's insurability, an insurer must initially decide
how much information must be gained from the application to properly underwrite
the risk.70 "[T]he more detailed the application, the better an insurer can screen out
unacceptable risks.",71 Conversely, the more liberal the underwriting before issu-
ance of the policy, the greater the risk. The decision regarding the extent of pre-
issuance underwriting is primarily a marketing decision for the insurer. "[I]nsurers
must decide whether to investigate their applicants at the beginning, in which case
they will accept fewer applications but also insure better risks, or increase sales by
simplifying their underwriting requirements at the time of purchase and risk ad-
verse selection." 72 When the marketing decision is made to increase policy sales
by means of a simplified underwriting process, "applications are approved rou-
tinely and without further investigation by the underwriter." 73 Instead, the decision
to insure the applicant is made on the basis of a short questionnaire with no detailed
medical statement or physical examination.7 4 "In fact, some applications either
limit the inquiries to whether the insured is now in 'good health' and/or has been
diagnosed or treated for certain medical conditions within a specified time period.
Or perhaps they don't ask any health questions at all."'  Thus, frequently an in-
surer's investigation of the applicant is limited only to the ascertainment of infor-
mation such as "character, general reputation, personal characteristics, and mode of
living" with "no follow up procedure to determine the medical status of potential
8 White v. Continental Gen. Ins. Co., 831 F. Supp. 1545, 1556 (D. Wyo. 1993).
69 See Robert Works, Coverage Clauses and Incontestable Statutes: The Regulation of Post-Claim
Underwriting, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 809, 813 [hereinafter Works, Coverage Clauses] (describing the incontest-
able clause as a bulwark against the effects of unreasonable post-claim underwriting).
70 See Gary Schuman, Health and Life Insurance Applications: Their Role in the Claims Review
Process, 62 DEF. CouNs. J. 225, 243(1995).
71 Id. at 243.
72 Id. at 226.
73 Id.
74 See id.
75 Schuman, supra note 70, at 226.
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insureds." 76 "It [is] only after [the insurer has] lost that it proceed[s] to make in-
quiries and extensive investigations into a medical history - inquiries not a part of
[the] usual underwriting procedure." 77
Thus, an insurer relies upon post claim underwriting to avoid the conse-
quences of its reasoned marketing decision to forego underwriting, or engage in
simplified underwriting, to increase sales and, concomitantly, profits - a decision
that naturally results in adverse selection. Obviously, an insurer should be held to
the consequences of a marketing decision that it knows will result in adverse selec-
tion. An insured should not lose coverage, as an alleged bad risk, simply to protect
an insurer from its own reasoned decision to increase profits by extending insur-
ance coverage to that very same bad risk. In other words, the insured should not be
made victim to the very same adverse risk an insurer was willing to embrace in the
interest of profit and greed.
G. Patently Unfair
Some courts have addressed the inherent unfairness of post claim under-
writing.78 The Mississippi Supreme Court, however, has made a forthright con-
demnation of post claim underwriting by proclaiming the practice to be patently
unfair.79
It is patently unfair for a claimant to obtain a policy, pay his pre-
miums and operate under the assumption that he is insured against
a specified risk, only to learn after he submits a claim that he is
not insured, and therefore, cannot obtain any other policy to cover
the loss. The insurer controls when the underwriting occurs. It
therefore should be estopped from determining whether to accept
an insured six months or more after a policy is issued. If the in-
sured is not an acceptable risk, the application should be denied up
front, not after a policy is issued. This allows the proposed insured
to seek other coverage with another company since no company
will insure an individual who has suffered serious illness or in-
jury.8
0
By relying upon the insurer's control of when underwriting occurs as a ra-
tionale for its conclusion that post claim underwriting is patently unfair, the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court has tacitly recognized the insurer's efforts to fix the odds of
76 Southern United Life Ins. Co. v. Caves, 481 So. 2d 764,767 (Miss. 1985).
Id. at 768.
78 See Gardner v. League Life Ins. Co., 210 N.W.2d 897 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973); Lewis v. Equity
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 637 So. 2d 183 (Miss. 1994); USLife Credit Life Ins. Co. v. McAfee, 630 P.2d 450
(Wash. Ct. App. 1981); Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. McGee, 444 So. 2d 803 (Miss. 1983).
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the aleatory contract in an endeavor to maintain exorbitant profit margins through a
reasoned marketing decision. In other words, it is patently unfair for an insurer to
make a reasoned marketing decision to forego underwriting to increase marketabil-
ity and profits of an insurance product and then hide "behind a veil of self-imposed
nescience" '81 in an effort to avoid the naturally resulting adverse selection. Thus,
when an insurer has manifested "an intention to 'insure the world," 82 it is patently
unfair to allow it to absolve itself of liability by claiming that the policy should
never have been issued in the first place because the insured was not a good risk.
"In short, '[t]he insurer having failed to investigate, cannot be heard to complainnow.'"iM
The Mississippi Supreme Court, however, puts forth a second rationale as
a foundation for its conclusion that post claim underwriting is patently unfair. That
rationale is premised upon the insured's natural assumption that there is insurance
coverage for a specified risk. Under this reasoning, an insurer should be prevented
"from lulling the insured, by inaction, into fancied security,"84 and, then belatedly
asserting a lack of coverage premised upon underwriting that never took place be-
fore issuance. In other words, the court implicitly found that an insured's reason-
able expectations of coverage should not be defeated by an insurer who has "en-
gaged in unreasonable post claim underwriting by unnecessarily deferring an un-
derwriting decision that could have been made at the inception stage"83 of the con-
tract of insurance. To conclude otherwise would "invite manifest abuse of the pub-
lic in [insurance] relationships." 8
H. Redux
As previously noted, "the fundamental function of contract law ... is to
deter opportunistic conduct." 87 Moreover, judicial doctrines in the context of insur-
ance disputes, because of the "quasi-public nature of the insurance business," 88 are
influenced by additional societal interests.89 As a consequence, doctrines governing
contractual relations in insurance may impose a duty on an insurer "regardless of
the company's desire to assume it. ' The foregoing discussion of insurance com-
pany.efforts to: (A) "fix the odds" of an aleatory contract; (B) seek additional prof-
81 Caves, 481 So. 2d at 768.
82 Id.
83 Works, Coverage Clauses, supra note 69, at 837.
84 Id. at 813 (describing the limiting dimension of the incontestable clause as a disclosure provision).
85 Id. at 870.
86 Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. McGee, 444 So. 2d 803, 811 (Miss. 1983).
87 PosNER, supra note 1, at 103.
88 Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 456 P.2d 674, 681 (Cal. 1969).
89 See generally KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 23.
90 Barrera, 456 P.2d at 681 n. 6.
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its despite exceptionally low loss-ratios; (C) rely upon the deceit of its own agents
to deny a claim; (D) avoid the consequences of a marketing decision that naturally
leads to adverse selection; and, (E) continue the practice of post claim underwrit-
ing, despite its inherent unfairness, illustrates a manifest need for a doctrinal limita-
tion on an insurer's invocation of inception defenses, such as misrepresentation,
fraud and concealment, 9' if it has unreasonably delayed underwriting that could
have been completed at the inception stage92 of the insurance contract.
A doctrinal limitation is required because insurers have demonstrated an
intent to manipulate the sequential character of the insurance relationship so as to
deprive the insured of the benefit of the bargain under the terms of the insurance
contract. This opportunistic behavior is made possible by the practice of post claim
underwriting. Post claim underwriting effectuates the manipulation because it en-
ables the insurer to invoke inception defenses that require rescission of the insur-
ance policy, ab initio. If an "insurer can perpetually postpone the investigation of
insurability and concurrently retain the right to rescind" 93 until after a claim has
been made, then an insurer can accept premiums, deal with the insured as if there is
coverage, lead the insured to believe that he is covered, and never take on the risk
that is inherent to the business of insurance. 94 Therefore, if the public is to be pro-
tected from such opportunistic manipulation of the insurance relationship, then the
insurer must be prevented from raising inception defenses premised upon informa-
tion acquired from unreasonably delayed underwriting. A doctrine establishing post
claim underwriting as per se bad faith will afford such protection.
IV. POST CLAIM UNDERWRITING AS PER SE BAD FAITH
A. Opportunism and Bad Faith
1. Opportunism
Judge Posner has observed that the fundamental purpose of contract law is
to deter opportunism in the contractual relationship.95 In addition, he has opined
that good faith performance means "not trying to take advantage of the vulnerabili-
ties created by the sequential character of contractual performance., 96 In other
words, for Posner, good faith performance means that a party to a contract does not
take advantage of the postponement in fulfilling its promise that is made possible
by sequential performance. Conversely, bad faith - opportunism - occurs when one
party to the contract takes advantage of that postponement.
91 See Works, Coverage Clauses, supra note 69, at 829.
92 See id. at 870.
93 Barrera, 456 P.2d at 682.
94 See id.
95 See POSNER, supra note 1, at 103.
96 Id.
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Performance obligations of the parties to a contract are, typically, not si-
multaneous. 97 Instead, most contracts call for sequential performance by one or
both of the contracting parties. Not surprisingly, insurance contracts, like most con-
tracts, call for sequential performance. Thus, "[the insured] may find himself at the
mercy [of the insurer] unless the law of contracts protects him' 98 from opportun-
ism.
Post claim underwriting satisfies Judge Posner's definition of opportunism.
The practice is only effective as a means of contract avoidance because of the vul-
nerabilities given rise to by sequential performance. As a consequence, the law of
contracts must protect the insured from the practice if it is to forcefully and effi-
ciently deter opportunism.
An insurer engaged in post claim underwriting tries to take advantage of
the postponement in fulfilling its promise, made possible by sequential perform-
ance, by waiting until after a claim has been filed to determine an insured's eligibil-
ity. It takes advantage of the insured because it continues to accept premiums from
the insured, knowing that it will later challenge the insured's eligibility for cover-
age to avoid contract performance. As a consequence, the law of contracts should
protect the insured from an insurer's efforts to implement post claim underwriting
as a means of taking advantage of the vulnerabilities created by sequential per-
formance.
Judge Posner's observations about opportunism find their way into the law
of contracts through the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing.99 More specifically,
Judge Posner's declaration that the fundamental purpose of contract law is to deter
opportunism in the contractual relationship is effectuated by the doctrine of bad
faith in insurance law.
2. Bad Faith
The doctrine of bad faith, employed in the context of insurance company
claims practices, is premised upon contract law's positive corollary - good faith
and fair dealing. As noted, supra, at its core, good faith performance means not
trying "to take advantage of the vulnerabilities created by the sequential character
of contractual performance."' 0
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 205 ensures the deterrence
of opportunistic behavior when it provides that "[e]very contract imposes upon
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforce-
ment."'' 1 Thus, good faith performance is an implied term of every contract.'02
Although the Restatement imposes this duty upon each party to a contract, a major-
97 See Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1285 (7th Cir. 1986).
98 Id.
99 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACfS § 205 (1979).
100 POSNER, supra note 1, at 103.
101 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 205 (1979).
102 See generally POSNER, supra note 1, at § 4.1.
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ity of courts applying Section 205 to insurance contracts have viewed its dictates as
a "one-way street in favor of the insured [because] the insured needs protection but
the insurer does not.",
10 3
Approximately forty-three states hold an insurer liable to a first-party in-
sured, in tort for damages, if the insurer acts in bad faith in the course of the claims
process. 1' 4 There are fundamentally two models of bad faith in the insurance con-
text. Those states embracing the cause of action will generally adhere to one or the
other, or fall within a spectrum somewhere between the two.
The first model of insurance contract bad faith was established by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in the 1973 case of Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Com-
pany.10 5 The Gruenberg inquiry is essentially one of reasonableness. In the court's
words, "when the insurer unreasonably and in bad faith withholds payment of the
claim of its insured, it is subject to liability in tort."' 106 Thus, under Gruenberg,
there is a single objective inquiry - whether a reasonable insurer, under the circum-
stances, would have engaged either in the claims practice'07 that culminated in "an
irresponsible decision not to pay" the claim or in an unwarranted delay in the pay-
ment of benefits.'0 8
The second model was formulated in Anderson v. Continental Insurance
Co., a 1978 opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court.'09 The Anderson model cre-
ates a stricter standard of liability for bad faith. To prove bad faith under Anderson,
a plaintiff must show both: (1) the absence of a reasonable basis for the insurer's
denial of benefits under the policy; and, (2) the insurer's "knowledge or reckless
disregard of the lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim."110 Thus, pursuant
to Anderson, a plaintiff must satisfy a two-pronged inquiry; the first requiring an
objective analysis of reasonableness akin to Gruenberg, and the second necessitat-
103 JERRY, supra note 4, at § 25G[4].
104 See WILLIAM M. SHERNOFF Er AL., INSURANCE BAD FAITH LIGATION § 1.01 (1999). It should
be noted that West Virginia is not among those states embracing the classic model of the bad faith tort. West
Virginia has, instead, established a cause of action for insurer claims misconduct characterized, by one com-
mentator, as a "strict liability test.., on a theory of breach of contract." Roger C. Henderson, The Tort of
Bad Faith in First-Party Insurance Transactions: Refining the Standard of Culpability and Reformulating the
Remedies by Statute, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1, 41 (1992-93); Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 352
S.E.2d 73, 74 Syl. Pt. 1 (1986) (Whenever a policyholder substantially prevails in a property damage suit
against its insurer, the insurer is liable for: (1) the insured's reasonable attorneys' fees in vindicating its claim;
(2) the insured's damages for net economic loss caused by the delay in settlement, and damages for aggrava-
tion and inconvenience.).
105 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1979).
106 Id.
107 See Crisci v. Security Insurance Co., 426 P.2d. 173, 176 (Cal. 1967) (in the context of third party
bad faith settlement claims practices, the inquiry is "whether a prudent insurer without policy limits would
have accepted the settlement offer"). The Gruenberg Court relied heavily upon the Crisci opinion in its
extension of bad faith claims to first party insurance. Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1036-1037.
108 KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 23, at 908.
109 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978).
110 Id. at 376.
[Vol. 102:809
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ing an evaluation of an insurer's intent.
It is important to recognize, however, that under Anderson, the inquiry as
to the insurer's intent may be satisfied through inference. Thus, "the knowledge of
the lack of a reasonable basis may be inferred and imputed to an insurance com-
pany ' 111 if there is: (a) "a reckless disregard of a lack of a reasonable basis for
denial, ' 112 or (b) "a reckless indifference to facts or proofs submitted by the in-
sured"' 113 in relation to the claim.
In originating this standard of bad faith, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
noted that the underlying facts in Anderson evinced "purposeful conduct by the
insurance company designed to evade payment of the claim."'1 14 In addition, the
court engaged in a definitional interpretation and found: (a) that "bad faith" is de-
fined as "deceit, duplicity, insincerity"; (b) that deceit is defined as "a stratagem,
trick, wile"; and (c) that duplicity is defined as "deliberate deceptiveness in behav-
ior or speech."' 115 Thus, borrowing from Judge Posner's definition of good faith and
stating it in the converse, the second prong of Anderson might best be described as
satisfied by a stratagem designed to take advantage of the insured's vulnerabilities
created by the sequential character of the insurer's contractual performance under
the terms of the insurance policy. 16
As discussed, infra, post claim underwriting satisfies the requisite standard
of bad faith under either Gruenberg or Anderson. As such, these standards of bad
faith support the creation of a doctrine of per se liability of any insurer that engages
in the practice.
a. Post Claim Underwriting and the Gruenberg Model
As previously noted, the Gruenberg model of bad faith is essentially a rea-
sonableness standard. The question posited, at its core, is whether a reasonable
insurer, under the circumstances, would have engaged in the complained of claims
practice. In reviewing claims of bad faith, premised upon post claims underwriting,
courts have commented upon expert evidence related to standard insurance industry
claims practices and underwriting. An inquiry into such practices is appropriate
because a deviation from reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing may
indicate a contracting party's bad faith in the performance of contractual obliga-
tions." 7




114 Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 376.
115 Id. at 376-77.
116 See generally POSNER, supra note 1, at § 4.1.
117 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACrs § 205, cmt. a (1979) (good faith means honesty in
fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade).
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for the insurer to do a comprehensive investigation before agreeing to insure a per-
son." 118 This conforms with the purpose of underwriting: "to determine whether,
and on what basis, [an insurer] will accept an application of insurance."" 9 In addi-
tion, the conclusion is consistent with the directive that insurers have the primary
responsibility for assessing the risk because they control when underwriting oc-
curs.' 20 This latter rationale implicitly recognizes that the insurer's position in the
contractual relationship gives rise to a greater propensity for manipulation of the
vulnerabilities created by sequential performance.
121
Courts have also held that post claim underwriting may support a cause of
action for bad faith claims practices. 122 These holdings implicitly recognize that
post claims underwriting is an unreasonable deviation from the standard industry
practice of pre-issuance underwriting, and that this unreasonable deviation culmi-
nates in either an irresponsible decision not to pay, or an unwarranted delay in
payment.
The conclusion that post claim underwriting unreasonably deviates from
standard industry practice is necessarily reached because an insurer engages in post
claim underwriting so as to rescind the policy only after a claim has been made.'23
Thus, the insurer, rather than processing the claim pursuant to the appropriate cov-
erage provisions of the policy, endeavors to avoid payment of benefits by engaging
in an eligibility determination that should have been completed before the policy
was issued. More particularly, the performance of a post claim risk assessment is
diametrically opposed to the good faith industry practice of pre-issuance underwrit-
ing established in the seventeenth century at Lloyd's. This sequence of underwrit-
ing ensures good faith and fair dealing in the sequence and performance of the alea-
tory contract.
Finally, post claim underwriting guarantees that payment of the claim is
unreasonably delayed because both underwriting and claims processing are com-
pleted after the claim is made, or, the claim is unreasonably denied because the
insurer unnecessarily delayed its underwriting decision until the claims process was
triggered. 124 Thus, an insurer engaged in post claim underwriting attempts, in bad
faith, to take advantage of the sequential character of the insurance contract to
avoid its contractual obligations through imposition of an unreasonable claim prac-
tice. As such, the "practice" of post claim underwriting satisfies the Gruenberg
model of unreasonableness. Because the "practice" alone, absent any consideration
118 White v. Continental Gen. Ins. Co., 831 F. Supp. 1545, 1556 (D. Wyo. 1993).
119 Schuman, supra note 70, at 227.
120 See Lewis v. Equity Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 637 So. 2d 183, 189 (Miss. 1994).
121 See POSNER, supra note 1, at § 4.1.
122 See Ingalls v. Paul Revere Ins. Group, 561 N.W.2d 273, 285 (N.D. 1997) (the insurer engaged in a
process of post "claim underwriting," according to one testifying expert, when, "instead of looking to pay
the claim," it began to "look for all the things in the application that [it] might be able to dig up that would
allow it to rescind the policy"); see also Lewis, 637 So. 2d at 189.
123 See Nassen v. National States Ins. Co., 494 N.W.2d 231,235 (Iowa 1992).
124 See Works, Coverage Clause, supra note 69, at 813.
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of individualized facts satisfies the Gruenberg model, the imposition of a per se
rule of bad faith to deter this inherently opportunistic conduct is appropriate.
b. Post Claim Underwriting and the Anderson Model
As discussed, supra, the Anderson model of bad faith necessitates the ap-
plication of a two- pronged analysis. The inquiry under the first prong - the "rea-
sonableness prong" - is satisfied through application of the Gruenberg model. 25
Thus, the foregoing analysis of post claims underwriting and Gruenberg leaves
only application of the second Anderson prong for discussion.
The second Anderson prong directs that an insurer may be found to have
acted in bad faith if it evidences the requisite intent - "knowledge or reckless dis-
regard of the lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim., 126 To satisfy this
element, an insurer must have engaged in "purposeful conduct... designed to
evade payment of the claim."'127 In addition, given the Anderson court's defini-
tional interpretation of bad faith and its imprimatur of implied intent, it is clear that
the insurer may possess the requisite scienter if it employs a "stratagem" in "reck-
less disregard of the lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim, 128 so as to
evade payment of the claim. Thus, again borrowing from Judge Posner's analysis,
the second Anderson prong prevents an insurer from employing a stratagem de-
signed to take advantage of the sequential character of the insurance contract.
Post claim underwriting constitutes such a stratagem. It satisfies the second
prong of Anderson because an insurer engaged in the practice, issues a policy, real-
izes large amounts of premium income, and then purposefully delays payment of
the claim to engage in an aggressive investigation of eligibility with the sole aim of
attempting to rescind the policy so as to deny coverage on a theory of misrepresen-
tation. 29 Therefore, the insurer engaged in post claim underwriting evidences the
requisite scienter under Anderson because it issues policies with the knowledge that
it will later seek out inaccuracies in the application as a means of avoiding liability
for the loss for which it has become obligated without regard to the coverage provi-
sions of the policy. 3 °
Finally, the fact that post claim underwriting is a stratagem or practice that
125 See Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 375 (Wis. 1978) (citing Gruenberg v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1038 (Cal. 1973) ("[W]e expressly adopt the Gruenberg statement as declar-
ing the accepted law.")
126 d at 376.
127 Id.
128 M
129 See Cordell, supra note 35, at 59 (the insurer issues policies after only superficial underwriting to
realize large amounts of premium income and then attempts to deny coverage on the grounds of misrepresen-
tation by engaging in aggressive investigation of the risk after the insured makes a claim).
130 See id. (stating that courts often criticize post claim underwriting because it allows an insurer to
accept income generated from questionable policies while knowing that the insurer may, at a later date, raise
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satisfies the Anderson model of bad faith yields the conclusion that a per se prohi-
bition is mandated. If an industry practice facially establishes opportunism, the
insurance law should embrace and fully effectuate its obligation to deter opportun-
ism in the insurance relationship by deterring that practice. This goal can be uni-
formly and efficiently accomplished only through the establishment of a per se rule
of bad faith.
B. Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 172 Forecloses an Insurer En-
gaged in Post Claim Underwriting from Asserting the Inception Defense of
Misrepresentation
A per se rule of bad faith, in the context of post claim underwriting, is fur-
ther supported by the Restatement position on the availability of defenses to con-
tract breaches. Insurers engage in post claim underwriting - the implementation of
an aggressive investigation of eligibility after a claim is filed - so as to deny cover-
age on a theory of misrepresentation. 31 If a misrepresentation is found, the contract
is then voidable. 132 Thus, the insurer, at its option, is relieved of all contractual ob-
ligations by rescission. However, "[t]he obligation of good faith and fair dealing
[also] extends to the assertion of... contract claims and defenses."'3 As a conse-
quence, an insurer, pursuant to Section 205, is prevented from asserting a defense
for nonperformance of its contractual obligations, such as the inception defense of
rescission, if it is not relied upon in good faith. Therefore, (d la Posner) the insurer
is not only prohibited from engaging in opportunistic conduct in relation to the
fulfillment of its sequential performance obligations to its insured; it cannot attempt
to justify any breach of that obligation if its defense is occasioned by conduct
which seeks to take advantage of the vulnerabilities created by that contractual
relationship.
The Restatement, in addition to setting forth a general requirement of good
faith reliance upon contract defenses, mandates the satisfaction of four elements to
void a contract for misrepresentation. The party seeking rescission must demon-
strate the presence of: (1) a misrepresentation; (2) that is either fraudulent or mate-
rial; (3) which induced the recipient to make the contract; and (4) the recipient's
reliance on the misrepresentation must have been justified.'3 4 It is the fourth ele-
ment - the requirement of "justified reliance" - that expressly incorporates within
its parameters the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. It is this fourth
element which prohibits an insurer engaged in post claim underwriting from relying
upon the inception defense of misrepresentation.
The fourth element of justified reliance is fully articulated in the converse
131 See id. (stating that the insurer issues policies after only superficial underwriting to realize large
amounts of premium income and then attempts to deny coverage on the grounds of misrepresentation by
engaging in aggressive investigation of the risk after the insured makes a claim).
132 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Chapter 7, topic 1 intro, note.
133 Id. § 205 cmt. e (1979).
134 See id., chapter 7, topic 1 intro, note.
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by Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 172. Section 172 instructs when
reliance upon a misrepresentation is unjustified because of the fault of the recipient.
"A recipient's fault in not knowing or discovering the facts before making the con-
tract does not make his reliance unjustified unless it amounts to a failure to act in
good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing. ' as Thus,
pursuant to Section 172, if an insurer's fault, in not knowing or not discovering a
misrepresentation, results from its failure to act in good faith and in accordance
with reasonable standards of fair dealing, then reliance upon the insured's misrep-
resentation - whether innocent or fraudulent 36 - is unjustified. Therefore, an in-
surer cannot rely upon a misrepresentation by an insured in the application process
- even if fraudulent - as a vehicle for rescission of the policy, if it did not know of
or discover the misrepresentation because of its own bad faith. That post claim
underwriting deviates from reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
insurance industry is irrefutable. 37 Industry practice for underwriting has been
established, at least since the seventeenth century; and that industry practice man-
dates pre-issuance underwriting.'3
When post claim underwriting is analyzed under both Section 172 and the
GruenberglAnderson theories of bad faith, it is clear that an insurer is foreclosed
from claiming a misrepresentation on a policy application as a basis for rescission
of the policy. This holds true because both Gruenberg and Anderson establish post-
claim underwriting as a bad faith claim practice. In addition, because the insurer's
fault in not knowing or not discovering the misrepresentation, prior to the filing of
a claim, directly arises from the purposeful stratagem of post claim underwriting -
a stratagem employed in bad faith and not in accord with standard, reasonable in-
dustry practices - the insurer's reliance upon the misrepresentation is unjustified
and, therefore, cannot result in rescission of the policy. Thus, pursuant to Section
172, regardless of whether the insured's misrepresentation was innocent or fraudu-
lent, an insurer cannot seek rescission if it engaged in post claim underwriting be-
cause it acted in bad faith and contrary to reasonable standards of fair dealing by
attempting to hide "behind a veil of self-imposed nescience"' 139 with the sole aim
of subsequently avoiding liability for a loss for which it had contracted.
C. Punitive Damages
Having set forth the parameters of a per se bad faith cause of action for
post claim underwriting, the question arises as to what damages a prevailing in-
135 Id. § 172 (1981) (emphasis added).
136 See id. § 172 cm. b (1981) (the rule stated in this section applies to innocent as well as to fraudu-
lent misrepresentations).
137 See, e. g., Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-103(I)(b), in which good faith includes "the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. A (additional meanings of good faith).
138 See discussion, supra, regarding the etymology of underwriting in Lloyd's Coffee House.
139 Southern United Life Ins. Co. v. Caves, 481 So. 2d 764,768 (Miss. 1985).
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sured may be due? In successful bad faith actions, the full range of tort damages is
generally warranted. Thus, a prevailing insured should, at the very least, be
awarded actual and compensatory damages. Therefore, an insured subjected to post
claim underwriting should be entitled to: (1) policy proceeds; (2) prejudgment in-
terest; (3) attorney fees; (4) costs; (5) expenses; and (6) net economic loss. In addi-
tion, upon proof, the insured should be compensated for any emotional distress
occasioned by the bad faith refusal to pay policy proceeds.
140
Punitive damages are included within the full range of tort damages. In ad-
dition, it is well settled that punitive damages may be awarded in insurance bad
faith cases that sound in tort - such as the instant per se cause of action.' 4' Gener-
ally, courts award punitive damages only in the appropriate case. 142 Therefore, it
naturally follows that the next question to be addressed is what might constitute the
appropriate case for an award of punitive damages.
Arguably, because post claim underwriting is per se bad faith under
Anderson, 143 an insured subjected to the practice should automatically or mechani-
cally be awarded actual, compensatory, and punitive damages.' 4 This conclusion
necessarily arises once it is observed that Anderson's strict standard of liability for
bad faith includes an element of scienter: "knowledge or reckless disregard of the
lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim.' ' 145 Given the high degree of con-
scious wrongdoing necessary to support a cause of action for bad faith under
Anderson, any distinction between conduct giving rise to compensatory damages
and conduct sufficient to support an award of punitive damages becomes, at best,
illusory.146 Anderson's second scienter prong should, therefore, satisfy the require-
ment of conscious wrongdoing necessary for the imposition of punitive damages in
most jurisdictions.147
The automatic or mechanical imposition of punitive damages against an
insurer engaged in post claim underwriting is further supported by the absence of
any defense for an insurer engaged in the practice.'48 One longstanding argument
against the award of punitive damages in insurance bad faith claims has been that
insurers, when making the decision to deny a claim, believe their decision to be
reasonable. Therefore, goes the argument, "an assessment of whether to penalize
140 See generally SHERNOFF, supra note 104, § 7.04.
141 See id. § 8.05.
142 See id.
143 Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978).
144 In stating that punitive damages are "automatically" or "mechanically" awarded we mean only
that the plaintiff need not surmount any additional legal hurdle.
145 Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 376.
146 See SHERNOFF, supra note 104, § 8.06[2].
147 See id. § 8.06[l].
148 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
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an insurer should not be predicated on the resolution of the coverage dispute."'
149
The per se rule of bad faith submitted for consideration here, however, is not prem-
ised upon what one would traditionally describe as a coverage dispute. Once it is
determined that the insurer engaged in post claim underwriting, there is no longer a
question of reasonableness. No reasonable insurer engages in post claim underwrit-
ing.1
50
Finally, the automatic award of punitive damages to a prevailing insured
subjected to post claim underwriting is supported by the manifest need to deter this
decidedly opportunistic practice. Mechanically imposing punitive damages against
any insurer, found to have engaged in the practice, should ensure its immediate and
efficient eradication.
An alternative analysis of what constitutes the appropriate bad faith case is
found within the national norm. The appropriate case, in the majority of jurisdic-
tions, is one in which there is evidence of some conscious wrongdoing by the in-
surer.151 The precise formula for establishing the requisite conscious wrongdoing
varies somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. However, the national norm is
best represented by the California standard of oppression, fraud, malice, or con-
scious disregard of the insured's rights.
152
The doctrine of insurance law bad faith, as a common law tort cause of ac-
tion, evolved initially within the California courts'ea Toward the end of full effec-
tuation of the doctrine, the California court, sanctioned the imposition of punitive
damages in bad faith insurance suits. 154 The California cases imposing punitive
damages, on those insurers in breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
have been cited with approval by courts in jurisdictions throughout the country.
155
Moreover, at least anecdotally, the threat of imposition of punitive damages has
effectively led to claims practice reforms by insurers hoping to avoid such liabil-
ity. 56 No clear precedent currently exists in relation to the imposition of punitive
damages in cases of post claim underwriting to aid in its deterrence. 15 7 Therefore, in
149 KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 23, § 7.10
150 This analysis might be viewed as the inverse of the "right to disagree rule." This rule provides
that "an insurer cannot be held accountable for punitive damages for seeking in good faith to pay only the
amount required by the contract." SHERNOFF, supra note 104, § 8.05. In other words, because no good faith
argument can be put forward by the insurer for engaging in post claim underwriting, there is no reason to
deny the imposition of punitive damages.
151 See id. § 8.06[1].
152 See Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 582 P.2d 980, 986 (Cal. 1978). West Virginia's standard
for the imposition of punitive damages in bad faith cases is actual malice. See Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm
Fire & Cas., 352 S.E.2d 73, 80 (W.Va. 1986).
153 See generally JERRY, supra note 4, § 25G.
154 See SHERNOFF, supra note 104, § 8.01.
155 See id.
156 See id.
157 The practice has, however, been recognized as evidence that may support an award of punitive
damages. See Reserve Life Ins. v. McGee, 444 So. 2d 803, 811-12 (Miss. 1983); Lewis v. Equity Nat'l Life
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defining what insurer conduct rises to the level of oppression, fraud, malice, or
conscious disregard of the insured's rights in the context of post claim underwrit-
ing, the California standard is a logical point of departure.
Punitive damages are awarded to a plaintiff "over and above the full com-
pensation for the injuries, for the purpose of punishing the defendant, of teaching
the defendant not to do it again, and of deterring others from following the defen-
dant's example."' 5 8 In addition, courts that have concluded that punitive damages
should be employed, either to punish insurers or to influence claims practices in the
future, including the California courts, have applied notably different standards to
the award of compensatory damages and punitive damages.1 59 Therefore, before
applying the California standard for punitive damages, a distinction must be drawn
between post claim underwriting conduct that gives rise to an award of actual and
compensatory damages, only, and conduct that additionally satisfies the standard of
oppression, fraud, malice, or conscious disregard of the insured's rights.
The dividing line between the two levels of conduct is best analyzed by
looking to the factual categories that might form the basis of an insured's bad faith
claim, premised upon post claim underwriting. An insured's cause of action for bad
faith would generally fall into two categories: (1) those cases in which only a single
occurrence of the practice of post claim underwriting is factually demonstrated by
the insured (an isolated incident); and (2) those cases in which it is established that
the insured was subjected to a conscious course of post claim underwriting, "f'irmly
grounded in established company policy" (a deliberate pattern or policy). 6 '
The first category is illustrated by an insurer's endeavor, post claim, to
"unfairly stretch" the underwriting inquiries "beyond the scope of their plain
meaning" in an effort to manufacture a misrepresentation by the insured in the
application for insurance. 161 In addition, some instances of agent misrepresentation
in completing the application may fall into this category.' 62
The second category is demonstrated by the insurer's company-wide pol-
icy'6 3 of post claim underwriting. Such a policy may be evidenced through claims
manual provisions that dictate that all claims or significant claims must be submit-
ted to the underwriting department instead of, or in addition to, the claims depart-
ment.' 64 In addition, manual provisions directing claims representatives to request
Ins. Co., 637 So. 2d 183, 188-89 (Miss. 1994); Ingalls v. Paul Revere Life Ins., 561 N.W.2d 273, 284-85
(N.D. 1997).
158 WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 2
(5th ed. 1984).
159 See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 23, § 7.10(a).
160 Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 582 P.2d 980, 987 (Cal. 1978).
161 Dickson-Witmer v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., No. 92C-07-107, 1994 WL 164554, at *4 (Del. Super.
Ct. Apr. 27, 1994). See also Ingalls, 561 N.W.2d at 278-79.
162 See, e.g., National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Miller, 484 So. 2d 329, 330-32 (Miss. 1985); Dixie
Ins. Co. v. Mooneyhan, 684 So. 2d 574, 577-79 (Miss. 1996).
163 See Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 352 S.E.2d 73, 78 n. 2 (W.Va. 1986).
164 See, e.g., Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 456 P.2d 674, 680 (Cal. 1969); Lewis v.
Equity Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 637 So. 2d 183, 184-85, 187 (Miss. 1994).
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health information only after a claim is filed or which direct that medical records
evidencing the insured's health pre-loss be procured, in addition to records related
to the loss, may serve to demonstrate a company-wide policy. Finally, an informal
policy of the aforementioned claims practices may be demonstrated through a de-
liberate and established pattern of conduct engaged in by the insurer.
Obviously, under either factual category the insured should be entitled to
recover the policy proceeds and any consequential damages. It is the second cate-
gory of a company-wide policy that forms the basis for application of the California
standard permitting an award of punitive damages.
The California Supreme Court has recognized that the requisite scienter for
the imposition of punitive damages may be inferred from a "conscious course of
conduct, firmly grounded in established company policy." 165 In addition, the court
has sanctioned reliance upon provisions within claims manuals' 66 as evidence that
the insurer "acted maliciously, with an intent to oppress, and in conscious disregard
of the rights of its insured." 67
California intermediate appellate courts, analyzing the appropriateness of
punitive damage awards premised upon insurer "conduct firmly grounded in estab-
lished company policy," have recognized that "a central theme common to those
cases which have sustained punitive awards is the existence of established policies
or practices in claims handling which are harmful to insureds."' 168 Thus, the Cali-
fornia courts have sought to deter what is perhaps more facilely described as an
insurer's systematic course of opportunistic breaches by equating repeated institu-
tional misconduct (i.e., conduct firmly grounded in established company policy)
with malice, oppression, fraud, or conscious disregard of the rights of insureds. The
decision to equate an insurer's established policies or practices with malice, op-
pression, fraud, or conscious disregard of the rights of insureds is logical because
the insurer has evidenced intent through a reasoned institutional decision.
Furthermore, equating malice, oppression, fraud, or conscious disregard of
the rights of insureds with a deliberate pattern or policy of post claim underwriting
is consistent with the reasoning of the California courts. Such an insurer has evi-
denced an intent to engage in a systematic course of opportunistic breaches. In
other words, the insurer has made a conscious institutional decision to disregard the
rights of its insureds by breaching its obligation to pay policy proceeds through
strategic behavior designed to: (1) exploit its monopoly on the timing and sequence
of underwriting; and (2) exploit insureds who are "bad risks" by collecting premi-
ums until a claim is filed - never allowing them the benefit of their bargain.' 69
Therefore, in applying the California court's reasoning to post claim un-
derwriting, it becomes clear that an insured subjected to a single incident of post
claim underwriting is entitled to actual and compensatory damages only. In con-
165 Neal, 582 P.2d at 987.
166 See id. at n. 8.
167 Id. at 986-87.
168 Mock v. Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594, 608 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
169 See supra Parts Ill.A and III.D.
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trast, an insured subjected to a deliberate pattern or policy of post claim underwrit-
ing1 70 by an insurer is entitled to an award of actual, compensatory, and punitive
damages.
Finally, imposing punitive damages upon an insurer engaged in a deliber-
ate pattern or policy of post claim underwriting is consistent with Judge Posner's
observation that opportunistic conduct "has no economic justification and ought
simply to be deterred."171 Moreover, the imposition of punitive damages for a com-
pany-wide policy of post claim underwriting fully effectuates Judge Posner's decla-
ration that "we might as well throw the book at the promisor" who breaches
opportunistically. 72 More importantly, imposing punitive damages against the in-
surer that relies upon a deliberate pattern or policy of post claim underwriting to
defeat the reasonable expectations of coverage of its insureds is obviously neces-
sary if the bad faith practice is to be forcefully and efficiently deterred.
We have set forth two alternative doctrinal approaches to the award of pu-
nitive damages because a court could easily adopt either one. The mechanical ap-
proach, establishing an appropriate case for the award of punitive damages through
reliance upon the Anderson scienter prong, is arguably the equivalent of the na-
tional norm. There is, also, a decided ease of application in a mechanical rule. On
the other hand, there is security in the time-tested standard of the national norm. In
addition, the clear delineation between compensatory and punitive damages under
the national norm preserves the traditional tort principle that punitive damages are
to be awarded over and above full compensation for injuries. As a consequence, the
best avenue is likely not the road less traveled. We submit that the better course is
adoption of the national norm. Therefore, punitive damages may be imposed
against an insurer engaged in the practice of post claim underwriting if the plaintiff
establishes a conscious course of conduct firmly grounded in established company
policy.
V. PRIOR CASES OF POST CLAIM UNDERWRITING DECIDED UPON ALTERNATIVE
THEORIES
Post claim underwriting has been known to masquerade its way through
the judicial system by assuming different aliases. Many courts confronted with the
practice of post claim underwriting (either explicitly or factually without label)
have ruled in favor of insureds and rejected insurer claims of misrepresentation, on
a case-by-case basis, by relying upon theories previously applied to insurance dis-
putes. Although these decisions have provided relief for some individual insureds,
the analysis has been less than uniform because no formal doctrine has devel-
oped.' 73 In addition, the theories that have been employed fail to eliminate, uni-
170 A company-wide policy of post claim underwriting; a conscious course of post claim underwriting
firmly grounded in established company policy.
171 POSNER, supra note 1, § 4.8, at 130.
172 Id.
173 One court even opined that "post-claim underwriting [is] a legitimate vehicle to diminish the cost
of insurance," without further comment, while, nonetheless, holding for the insured on a failure to notice
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formly, the misrepresentation defense. Therefore, courts inevitably wrestle, either
expressly or impliedly, with problems of comparative fault of insurer and insured,
frequently drawing a distinction between fraudulent and innocent misrepresenta-
tions' 74 or agent versus insured misrepresentations.' 75 Nonetheless, these judicial
forays into post claim underwriting have provided a foundation from which a more
uniform doctrinal approach may be asserted. Consequently, a review of the theories




"Waiver is an intentional, voluntary relinquishment of a known right."'
177
In the insurance context, "[w]aiver should only be applied when an insurer intends
to relinquish a known right because it entails volition in relation to an act and to the
legal consequences of the action."' 178 Courts may employ waiver as a means to
avoid operation of policy limitations on liability and coverage exclusions. 179 How-
ever, waiver may not be applied to "extend insurance coverage beyond the terms of
an insurance contract."' 80
In the typical case, waiver is implied from the conduct of the insurer or its
agents.'' For example, an insurer may waive the provisions of an exclusionary
clause by voluntarily making payment to an insured for a loss when the insurer had
full knowledge of the facts surrounding the circumstances of the loss and the in-
sured "neither withheld information nor distorted the facts presented to the [in-
theory. See Gardner v. League Life Ins. Co., 210 N.W. 897, 898 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973).
174 See, e.g., Dickson-Witmer v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., No. 92C-07-107, 1994 WL 164554 (Del.
Super. Ct Apr. 27, 1994); U.S. Life v. McAfee, 630 P.2d 450 (Wash. App. 1981); Ingalls v. Paul Revere Life
Ins., 561 N.W.2d 273 (N.D. 1997).
175 See, e.g., Dixie Ins. Co. v. Mooneyhan, 684 So. 2d 574 (Miss. 1996); National Life & Accident
Ins. Co. v. Miller, 484 So. 2d 329 (Miss. 1985); Reserve Life Ins. v. McGee, 44 So. 2d 803 (Miss. 1984);
Lewis v. Equity Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 637 So. 2d 183 (Miss. 1994).
176 The key article is KEErON & WmISS, supra note 23, § 6.1(b)(3). The text provides perhaps the
best explanation of the difference between waiver and estoppel - an important distinction as courts frequently
fail to distinguish between the two. As shown infra, the evidentiary requirements of the two doctrines are
decidedly divergent. Waiver, unlike estoppel, does not require the insured to show detrimental reliance.
The key national case is Hartford v. Doubler, 434 N.E.2d 1189 (111. App. 1982), cited in KEETON
& Wminss, supra note 23, § 6.1(b)(3). See also Gilbert Frank Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 457 N.Y.S.2d 494
(N.Y. App. Div. 1983), rev'd on facts, 520 N.E.2d 512 (N.Y. 1988), cited in JERRY, supra note 4, § 25E(a).
The key West Virginia case is Potesta v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 504 S.E.2d 135
(W.Va. 1998).
The key post claim underwriting case is Southern United Life Ins. Co. v. Caves, 481 So. 2d 764,
767 (Miss. 1985).
177 JERRY, supra note 4, § 25E(a).
178 KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 23, § 6.1(b)(3).
179 See JERRY, supra note 4, § 25E(a).
180 Potesta, 504 S.E.2d at 137, Syl. Pt. 5.
181 See Hartford, 434 N.E.2d at 1192.
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surer]. ' 18 2 Thus, waiver is perhaps best defined as a doctrine that precludes forfei-
ture if "the insurer acts in recognition of the validity of insurance, with knowledge
that there exists a ground to void the policy.
18 3
Waiver has been applied to the practice of post claim underwriting to pre-
vent insurers from relying upon misrepresentations for rescission of the policy. In
one case, an insurer was found to have waived a condition of insurability because
its agent "accepted payment of the premium knowing of the serious pre-existing
condition of the insured which she failed to communicate to the company."' 4 The
knowledge of the agent was imputed to the insurer to establish a knowing waiver of
a known right. As such, concluded the court, "[t]he condition of insurability was
effectively waived.' 85 Thus, the court applied waiver to the individualized facts to
reject the insurer's claim of a misrepresentation.
B. Estoppel'
88
To invoke estoppel, a party must satisfy two factors: (1) an actual misrep-
resentation; and (2) detrimental reliance upon that misrepresentation.' 87 In the in-
surance context, estoppel permits "the imposition of liability [upon the insurer] ...
on the basis of acts that usually were not intended to produce the consequences
which are sought by the [insured]" and the intent of the insurer is usually not rele-
vant.188 Thus, through application of the doctrine of estoppel, insurers have been
precluded from denying liability if their action or inaction has "induced the insured
to pursue activities contrary to the insured's best interests." 8 9
The elements of estoppel may be satisfied when an insurer with knowledge
of an innocent misrepresentation delivers the policy to the insured, and later en-
deavors to deny coverage. The insurer is estopped from asserting the misrepresen-
tation because delivery of the policy caused the insured to detrimentally rely upon
it as evidence of coverage. In other words, the insured was induced not to obtain
182 id. at 1191.
18,3 Gilbert Frank Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 457 N.Y.S.2d 494, 497 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983), rev'd on
facts, 520 N.E.2d 512 (N.Y. 1988).
184 Southern United Life Ins. Co. v. Caves, 481 So. 2d 764,767 (Miss. 1985).
185 Id.
186 The key article is KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 23, § 6.1(b)(3). As mentioned, supra, the text
provides perhaps the best explanation of the difference between waiver and estoppel - an important distinc-
tion as courts frequently fail to distinguish between the two. As shown both infra and supra the evidentiary
requirements are divergent. Estoppel, unlike waiver, requires the insured to show detrimental reliance.
The key national case is Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co., 255 A.2d 208 (N.J. 1969).
The key West Virginia case is Potesta v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 504 S.E.2d 135
(W.Va. 1998).
The key post claim underwriting case is Lewis v. Equity Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 637 So. 2d 183 (Miss.
1994).
187 See JERRY, supra note 4, § 25E(a).
188 KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 23, § 6.1(b)(3).
189 JERRY, supra note 4, § 25E(b).
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other insurance because the delivery of the policy (the actual misrepresentation)
caused the insured to believe that the needed coverage had already been pur-
chased. 9' Thius, estoppel may be used to bar a defense, such as misrepresentation,
in an action on an insurance policy.191
Courts have relied upon estoppel to reject the defense of misrepresentation
put forward by insurers engaged in the practice of post claim underwriting. The
most straightforward application of estoppel, in this regard, is premised upon the
detrimental reliance of the insured in paying premiums and the concomitant as-
sumption (misrepresentation) that because the insurer continues to accept the pre-
miums there is coverage in the event of a loss. The rationale for applying estoppel
is that the insurer is obligated to perform underwriting at the time of application for
insurance so that the insured may seek other coverage if the insurer finds the in-
sured an unacceptable risk.' 92 Estoppel as a basis for foreclosure of the defense of
misrepresentation, however, requires a factual analysis on a case-by-case basis.
C. Unconscionability
93
The doctrine of unconscionability is premised upon "the judicial recogni-
tion that most insurance contracts, rather than being the result of anything resem-
bling equal bargaining between the parties, are truly contracts of adhesion."'N Un-
conscionability permits a court to deny operation of contract terms if they are so
one sided that enforcement would be patently unfair.195 The doctrine may be in-
yoked to prevent enforcement of unambiguous terms if found to be "too restrictive
or otherwise against policy."' 96 In this regard, if a court determines that a contract
term is unconscionable it may: (1) refuse to enforce the contract; (2) enforce the
contract absent the unconscionable term; or, (3) limit the application of the uncon-
190 See id. § 25E(a).
191 See generally Harr, 255 A.2d at 218 (speaking broadly, equitable estoppel is available to bar a
defense in an action on a policy).
192 See Lewis v. Equity Natl Life Ins. Co., 637 So. 2d 183, 189 (Miss. 1994).
193 The key article is Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions: Parts
One & Two, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961 & 1281 (1970) [hereinafter Keeton, Insurance Rights].
The key national case is C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa
1975).
There is no key West Virginia case.
The key post claim underwriting case is Kraus v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 700 F.2d 870 (2d Cir.
1983).
194 LEE R. Russ, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 22:11 (3d ed. 1997). See also C&J Fertilizer, 227 N.W.2d
at 179 (Iowa 1975) (standardized contracts such as insurance policies, drafted by powerful commercial units
and put before individuals on the "accept this or get nothing" basis, are carefully scrutinized by the courts for
the purpose of avoiding enforcement of unconscionable clauses) (citing 6A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 1376 (1952)).
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scionable term to avoid an unconscionable result.197 Finally, contract terms may be
unconscionable "even if the parties were both aware of the intended effect of such
provision at the time of the contract."' 98 Unconscionability may be applied to any
policy provision that adversely affects an "insured's ability to obtain benefits under
[the] policy."199
Although applicable to any policy provision, unconscionability is typically
"raised in connection with [those] provisions that narrow or exclude coverage ' ' 200
in such a way as to render the contracted for coverage illusory. For example, a
definition of burglary in an insurance policy that required that the exterior of the
building evidence "visible marks of force and violence" was found to be an uncon-
scionable "liability-avoiding provision ... in the circumstances of [the] case.",
20
1
The provision was unconscionable because it permitted the insurer to deny cover-
age for a burglary loss that evidenced only visible marks of force or violence on the
interior doors of a warehouse.202 The policy term was construed to include the inte-
rior signs of burglary so as to limit application of an unconscionable term to avoid
an unconscionable result. Thus, the insured was allowed to recover for the loss,
despite the unambiguous definitional term of the policy.
The doctrine of unconscionability may appropriately be applied to post
claim underwriting because it allows an insurer to issue a policy, collect premiums,
and subsequently defeat coverage after a loss occurs. As such, the coverage af-
forded the insured prior to the loss "is illusory, unconscionable and against public
policy., 20 3 "An insurer may not collect a premium for a period during which it had
no risk. '' 204 Thus, the insured obtains no benefit from the premium paid for cover-
age, purportedly effective from the date of the application,0 5 because the insurer
reserves the right to defeat such coverage in the event of a loss.
20 6
Unconscionability has been relied upon, in a tertiary fashion, to reject the
197 See C&J Fertilizer, 227 N.W.2d at 180 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 234).
198 Russ, supra note 194, § 22:11.
Id.
200 Id.
201 C&J Fertilizer, 227 N.W.2d at 179.
202 See id. at 171-72.
203 Anderson v. Country Life Ins. Co., 886 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). Anderson is not a
true example of a post claim underwriting case. However, its reasoning applies equally well to the practice of
post claim underwriting. At issue in Anderson was an "approval conditional receipt" for which the insurer
required advance payment of premiums but conditioned temporary insurance on the issuance of a permanent
policy of insurance. Id. at 1386. The court, applying the doctrine of unconscionability, concluded that "public
policy prohibits an insurer from taking an advance premium and placing conditions in the receipt so that it
incurs no risk during the interim period for which it retains the premium." Id.
204 Id. at 1383.
205 See id. at 1388.
206 See id. at 1391.
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defense of ineligibility2 7 of an insured when the insurer engaged in post claim un-
derwriting.20 8 This application is illustrated by an insurer's efforts to reduce the
maximum coverage provided under a group life insurance policy because the in-
sured was a part-time worker, not a full-time employee. 20 9 The limitation on the
maximum coverage limits for part-time employees was never brought to the atten-
tion of the insured and a certificate of insurance was issued in a greater amount for
which increased premiums were paid over ten years.210 The insurer never inquired
into the insured's "part-time status on its application forms [nor] at any time prior
to his death.,
211
The insurer was estopped from asserting ineligibility as a defense because
the facts "would make it unjust, inequitable or unconscionable to allow [it] to be
interposed. 2 12 Thus, "it was neither just nor equitable" to allow the insurer to
make representations of coverage and then avoid such representations "on the basis
of a conflicting provision in the master policy which was not previously brought to




The doctrine of reasonable expectations is premised upon the fundamental
principle that "the objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended
beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even
though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those expec-
207 This defense is akin to the defense of innocent misrepresentation. However, it is unclear whether
the misrepresentation defense would be barred by unconscionability. In Borden v. Paul Revere Life Insurance
Co., 935 F.2d 370 (lst Cir. 1991), an insurance policy was rescinded, despite a jury finding of fraud and
unconscionable conditions in the bargaining process, because of misrepresentations in the application that
were not discovered or relied upon by the insured until after suit. The court concluded that the misrepresenta-
tion allowed rescission and, therefore, no policy of insurance was in existence. Thus, the insurer's conduct
had no contractual consequences. See id. at 377.
208 See Krauss v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. (Krauss I), 700 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1983). The
majority opinion in Krauss never utilizes the term "post claim underwriting." However, it is clear from the
facts that the insurer was engaged in the practice. Id. at 871-72. In addition, the concurrence makes specific
reference to "post-claim underwriting adjustments." Id. at 874 (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring). Note should
be made that Illinois law was the choice of law, and the ineligibility defense was, therefore, not barred by an
incontestability statute. See Krauss v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. (Krauss 1), 643 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1981).
209 See Krauss 11, 700 F.2d at 871.
210 See id.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 874 (citing Vasilakis v. Safeway Ins. Co., 361 N.E.2d 1, 3 (ill. App. Ct. 1977)).
213 Id.
214 The key article is Keeton, Insurance Rights, supra note 193.
The key national case is C&J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa
1975).
The key West Virginia case is Keller v. First Nat'l Bank, 403 S.E.2d 424 (W.Va. 1991). Keller is,
factually, West Virginia's post claim underwriting case.
The key post claim underwriting case is Barrera v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 456 P.2d 674
(Cal. 1969).
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tations." 215 Thus, "the existence of an ambiguity in the policy is not a predicate for
the doctrine's application., 216 The doctrine of reasonable expectations is best de-
scribed as one that is relied upon by the courts in an effort to protect consumers.217
The doctrine's operation is demonstrated by comparing the express lan-
guage of a policy's definition of burglary, in one reported case, with the reasonable
expectation of the insured as to what constitutes burglary. The policy at issue con-
tained the following definition of burglary:
the felonious abstraction of insured property (1) from within the
premises by a person making felonious entry therein by actual
force and violence, of which force and violence there are visible
marks made by tools, explosives, electricity or chemicals upon, or
physical damage to, the exterior of the premises at the place of
such entry .. .218
The covered building was burglarized with no visible signs of entry on its
exterior.219 However, an interior door "was physically damaged and carried visible
marks made by tools." 220 The insurer denied coverage for the loss occasioned by
the burglary, based upon the unambiguous, express policy language that excluded
burglaries that did not evidence visible signs of force or violence on the exterior of
the premises.221
The court, however, found the insured covered for the loss.m2 Although it
recognized that the policy definition was both unambiguous and express, it noted
that the doctrine of reasonable expectations attends to "substance over form."m In
applying the doctrine, the court reasoned that the burglary definition "which crept
into this policy comports neither with the concept a layman might have of that
215 ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 25D (1987) (citing Keeton, Insurance
Rights, supra note 193).
216 Id. It should be noted that West Virginia requires the presence of an ambiguity in the policy as a
predicate to application of the doctrine of reasonable expectations. See Silk v. Flat Top Construction, Inc.,
453 S.E.2d 356 (W.Va. 1994). In West Virginia, the doctrine of reasonable expectations is limited to those
instances in which the policy language is ambiguous. See id. at 359 (citing Soliva v. Shand, Morahan & Co.,
345 S.E.2d 33, 36 (W.Va. 1986), overruled on other grounds by National Mutual Insurance Co. v. McMahon
& Sons, Inc., 356 S.E.2d 488 (W. Va. 1987)). There are approximately eight other states that maintain the
same requirement (Montana, Wyoming, New Jersey, Nevada, Washington, Alaska, Minnesota, Hawaii). See
JERRY, supra note 4, § 25D, n.8.
217 See JERRY, supra note 4, § 25D.
218 C&J Fertilizer, 227 N.W.2d 169, 171.
219 See id.
220 Id.
221 See id. at 171-72.
222 See id. at 177.
223 C&J Fertilizer, 227 N.W.2d at 177.
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crime, nor with the legal interpretation."224 Therefore, based upon the policy's lan-
guage, the most the insured might have expected from the definition was "a re-
quirement of visible evidence (abundant here) indicating the burglary was an 'out-
side' not an 'inside' job." Thus, because the insured would reasonably expect
coverage for any outside job burglary, it was entitled to the policy proceeds for its
loss. 96
The doctrine of reasonable expectations has been employed in the context
of post claim underwriting to defeat an insurer's efforts to rescind a policy as void
ab initio for material misrepresentations made in the application for insurance.227
The reasonable expectation of coverage arose from the insurer's regular acceptance
of premium payments and lack of rejection of the application226 and the "reason-
able expectation of both the public and the insured... that the insurer will duly
perform its basic commitment: to provide insurance."'' 9 Thus, the reasonable ex-
pectation of the insured and the public defeated the stipulation in the application for
insurance providing that the company was not bound to provide coverage until the
application was both received and approved.
230
The application had not been approved before the loss claim because it was
the insurer's alleged practice to postpone underwriting of insurability "until after
the assertion of a 'significant' claim." 231 This practice was inconsistent with the
reasonable expectation of coverage because the insurer has a "duty to conduct a
reasonable investigation of insurability within a reasonable period of time after
issuance of the policy. ' 232 In addition, the reasonable expectation of coverage
would not allow the insurer to take the chances of a loss and then "repudiate the
contract and compel the insured to bear the loss. 'm The doctrine of reasonable
expectations, as applied to post claim underwriting, is a factual inquiry necessarily




227 See, e.g., Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 456 P.2d 674, 680 (Cal. 1969). The court in
Barrera, as in other cases, does not rely upon the term "post claim underwriting." However, the conduct of
the insurer as described in the factual account clearly evidences the practice.
228 See id. at 682.
229 Id.
230 See id.
231 Id. at 684.
232 Barrera, 456 P.2d at 685.
233 Id.
2 See hL at 690.
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E. Cause of Action for Statutory Unfair Claims Settlement Practices2z
All but six states have adopted statutes that prohibit insurers from engag-
ing in unfair settlement claims practices.236 These statutes are fashioned after
Model Acts promulgated by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC).237 Depending upon the reference source consulted, anywhere from five to
ten states allow a private cause of action for a violation of a statutory provision
prohibiting unfair settlement claims practices.8 The remainder restrict an insured
to administrative remedies provided within the statutory framework.239
The private cause of action, if not statutorily provided, is premised upon an
implied right that arises from the statute. Generally a court will apply a test similar
to the following to ascertain whether a judicially created implied cause of action is
consistent with legislative intent:
(1) the plaintiff must be a member of the class for whose benefit
the statute was enacted; (2) consideration must be given to legisla-
tive intent, express or implied, to determine whether a private
cause of action was intended; (3) an analysis must be made of
whether a private cause of action is consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme; and (4) such private cause of
action must not intrude into an area delegated exclusively to the
federal government.240
In addition, because statutes prohibiting unfair settlement claims practices fre-
quently contain a requirement for evidence of a "general business practice," 24 an
insured may be obligated to show "proof of several breaches by an insurance com-
235 There is no key article.
The key national case is Jenkins v. J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 280 S.E.2d 252 (W.Va. 1981),
overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Madden, 451 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va.
1994).
The key West Virginia case is Jenkins v. J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 280 S.E.2d 252 (W.Va. 1981),
overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Madden, 451 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va.
1994).
The key post claim underwriting case is Ingalls v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Group, 561 N.W.2d 273
(N.D. 1997).
236 Thomas C. Cady et. al., The Law of Insurance Company Claim Misconduct in West Virginia, 101
W.VA. L. REV. 1, 33 (1999).
237 See id.
238 See, e.g, STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS LIABILITY AND DAMAGES § 9.03 (2d ed.
1997); JOHN C. MCCARTHY, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR BAD FAITH § 2.24 (5th ed. 1990); BARRY R.
OSTRANGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HORNBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES § 12.03 (c) (10th ed.
2000); EUGENE R. ANDERSON, JORDAN S. STANZLER, & LORELLE S. MASTERS, INSURANCE COVERAGE
LITIGATION § 11.15 (a)(1) (2d ed. 1998).
239 See Cady, supra note 236, at 34.
240 Jenkins, 280 S.E.2d at Syl. Pt. 1.
241 W.VA. CODE § 33-11-4(9) (1999). See also Jenkins, 280 S.E.2d at 259.
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pany to sustain the cause of action. ' 242 The requirement of multiple breaches, gen-
erally, may be satisfied by evidence of either multiple violations in the same claim
or by proof of multiple violations involving different claimants. 243 However, in
some states, a single violation knowingly committed may be sufficient.
244
One state has held that post claim underwriting may be indicative of a
statutorily prohibited unfair settlement claims practice that may give rise to an im-
plied private cause of action.245 The court, however, also concluded that it was a
jury question as to whether the insurer, in fact, violated the statute.246
F. Insurer Fraud247
Claims of insurer fraud are premised upon the same factual allegations as
the classic tort- action. As such, five elements must be satisfied to sustain a cause of
action for insurer fraud.248 Those elements are: (1) the defendant made a false rep-
resentation; (2) the defendant knows or believes the representation is false, or
knows that he has an insufficient basis of information upon which to make the rep-
resentation; (3) the defendant has an intent "to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain
from acting in reliance upon the misrepresentation"; (4) the plaintiff is justified in
the reliance upon the misrepresentation; and (5) damage to the plaintiff resulted
from the reliance upon the misrepresentation.24 9
In the insurance context, fraud has been relied upon as a basis for a cause
of action when false representations were made by the insurer's agent to the in-
surer.250 The claim arose because the agent "did falsely and fraudulently fill in the
242 Jenkins, 280 S.E.2d at 259.
243 Id.
244 See, e.g., Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979), overruled by Moradi-
Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 59, 67 (Cal. 1988) (holding that an insurance statute prohibiting
insurance companies from engaging in unfair practices, such as not making good-faith effort to reach prompt
and fair settlement of claim, did not create any private cause of action in favor of insured or third-party claim-
ants).
245 See Ingalls v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Group, 561 N.W.2d 273, 283-284 (N.D. 1997).
246 See id. at 282.
247 The key article is RUSS, supra note 194, § 59:56.
The key national case is Gardner v. Mut. Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 84 S.E.2d 637 (S.C.
1954) (cause of action for fraud - false representations made by insurer's agent to insured). It should be noted
that Gardner is, factually, a post claim underwriting case.
The key West Virginia case is Romano v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 362 S.E.2d 334
(W.Va. 1987). Ramano, factually, could be classified as a post claim underwriting case.
The key post claim underwriting case is Nassen v. National States Ins. Co., 494 N.W.2d 231 (Iowa
1992) (expert testimony regarding post claim underwriting admissible to support claim of fraud). It should be
noted, however, that the Nassen court did not address the merits of the insured's fraud claim because it dupli-
cated damages available under the bad faith claim.
248 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 158, § 105.
249 Id. § 105, at 728.
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application with answers that were not the same nor as complete as those given by
the plaintiff and his wife. '251 The errors were brought to the attention of the agent
before the insured signed the application.2 2 The agent, however, assured the in-
sured that the application was properly completed and complied with the insurer's
needs.253 The insured had coverage under another policy that was dropped after
purchase of the new coverage. 5 4 Claims were made, and the insurer denied cover-
age, asserting material misrepresentations in the application.255 These facts were
held sufficient to support a tort law fraud action.
More recently, expert testimony regarding post claims underwriting has
been found to be relevant to a tort law fraud action.25 6 The expert testimony charac-
terized post claim underwriting as a fraudulent underwriting technique relied upon
by the insurer to deliberately delay or deny claims.25 7 In addition, the expert noted
that the insurer rubber stamped applications "with no serious effort to weed out
high-risk applicants," before the issuance of a policy.
25 8
G. Misstatements on Application Prepared by Agent 259
"Most courts have held that an agent who procures an application for in-
surance and reduces it to writing acts as the insurer's agent., 2 0 The rationale for
this normative rule lies in the general agent's authority "to accept risks, to agree
upon the terms of insurance contracts, to issue and renew policies, and to change or
modify the terms of existing contracts." '26' Therefore, the errors or misstatements
made by the agent in completing the application are generally treated as those of





256 See Nassen v. National States Ins. Co., 494 N.W.2d 231 (Iowa 1992).
257 See id. at 235.
258 Id.
259 There is no key article.
There is no key national case, presumptively because the cases are so fact dependent that it is
difficult to present a single case fully articulating the normative rule. However, a fairly exhaustive list of
relevant cases can be found in Russ, supra note 194, §§ 85:26, :57.
The key West Virginia case is McDonald v. Beneficial Standard Life Ins. Co., 235 S.E.2d 367
(W.VA. 1977) (if the facts regarding the risk are correctly stated to the agent but erroneously recorded, the
insurer is chargeable with the agent's error).
The key post claim underwriting case is Lewis v. Equity Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 637 So. 2d 183 (Miss.
1994).
260 JERRY, supra note 4, § 35[g][3].
261 Joseph K. Powers, Pulling the Plug on Fidelity, Crime, and All Risk Coverage: The Availability of
Rescission as a Remedy or Defense, 32 ToRT & INS. L.J. 905, 930 (1997).
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the insurer and not the insured.
262
This rule holds true so long as the agent making the misrepresentations in
the insurance application did so without the knowledge 63 or collusion of the in-
sured.264 However, knowledge of the agent's misrepresentations will generally not
be imputed to the insured if the agent represented "that the answers were properly
recorded in the application in such a way as to satisfy the requirements of the in-
surer." 265 In other words, the insured will not be deemed to have knowledge of the
misrepresentation if the insured relied upon the expertise of the agent concerning
such matters.266
The normative rule that misstatements made by the insurer's agent in com-
pleting an application will be chargeable to the insurer has been discussed in the
context of post claim underwriting as a means of defeating an insurer's claim of
rescission for misrepresentations. 267 It was, however, a jury question as to whether
the misrepresented information disclosed by the insured created an arguable basis
upon which to deny a claim. There is, however, judicial recognition that post
claim underwriting permits an insurer to profit by self-imposed nescience. In other
words, the insurer ignores the temptations for agents to include misrepresentations
in the application so as to increase sales and then subsequently performs underwrit-
ing to discover such falsehoods as a vehicle for rescission.269
In this regard, a commissioned agent's falsification of information on a
credit life insurance application has been relied upon to support a fraud action
within the context of post claim underwriting.270 The agent testified that "he knew
that if he indicated on the application form that [the insured] suffered from any
health problems, the credit life policy would not be issued." 271 In addition, the
agent knew that post claim underwriting could be completed up to one year after
262 JERRY, supra note 4, § 35[g][3].
263 Knowledge may be evidenced through a duty to read, if adhered to by a jurisdiction, see id., or by
attaching a copy of the application to the policy that is delivered. See Russ, supra note 194, § 85:53. It should
be noted, however, that "where the applicant has given truthful answers, and was induced by the agent not to
read the application before signing it," the failure to read does not constitute negligence. Id.
264 See Powers, supra note 261, at 930.
265 See RUss, supra note 194, § 85:35.
266 See id. § 85:57.
267 See Lewis v. Equity Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 637 So. 2d 183 (Miss. 1994).
268 See id. at 186.
269 National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Miller 484 So. 2d 329, 339 (Miss. 1985) (Hawkins, J., con-
curring).
270 See Union Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Crocker, 667 So. 2d 688 (Ala. 1995), vacated and remanded by
BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). On rehearing, the Alabama Supreme Court recalcu-
lated the punitive damages in light of the punitive damage test set out in Gore. See Union Sec. Life Ins. Co.
v. Crocker, 709 So.2d 1118 (Ala. 1997).
271 Id. at 692.
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issuance under the policy's incontestability clause.272 It was held that the agent had
a duty to disclose that the policy proceeds would not be paid if the insured had any
health problems.2 7 3 Therefore, the agent's failure to disclose "induced [the insured]
to obtain the credit life coverage, for which premiums were paid [but no coverage
was available]." 274 The analysis here, as with all instances of agent misrepresenta-
tion is exceedingly fact dependent and, therefore, may only be properly analyzed
on a case-by-case basis.
H. Incontestability
275
All life insurance policies contain an incontestability clause. 6 The clause
may also be found in other lines of insurance, in particular health insurance. 277
Generally, the inclusion of such clauses is mandated by statute. An incontestabil-
ity clause prohibits the insurer from contesting the validity of the policy after a
certain period of time has expired, usually two years.2 79 Thus, the incontestability
clause in a policy of insurance may bar the defenses of misrepresentation, fraud and
concealment. 20 The clause, however, cannot operate to prevent an insurer's chal-
lenge premised upon a policy's coverage provisions.8 1
This division between defenses that challenge the validity of a policy and
defenses premised upon coverage provisions of a policy, although facile in articula-
272 Se d273 See id.
273 See id.
274 Id.
275 The key article is Robert Works, Coverage Clauses and Incontestable Statutes: The Regulation of
Post-Claim Underwriting, 1979 U. ILL. L. REV. 809 (1979).
There is a split of authority, and so there is no true national case. One school adheres to the rea-
soning employed in Crawford v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States, 305 N.E.2d 144 (Ill.
1973) (when information as to whether an insured is indeed a member of the class of those insured under a
group policy is fumished by the employer, the question of coverage is intertwined with the question of
whether coverage was obtained by false pretenses). The second school follows Simpson v. Phoenix Mutual
Life Insurance Co., 247 N.E.2d 655 (N.Y. 1969) (incontestable clause bars defenses, including those related
to the scope of coverage and risks assumed, if the insurer could have discovered the facts at the policy's
inception).
The key West Virginia case is Poffenbarger v. New York Life Ins. Co., 277 F. Supp. 726 (S.D.
W.Va. 1967).
The key post claim underwriting case is Amex Life Assurance Co. v. Superior Court, 930 P.2d
1264 (Cal. 1997).
276 See JERRY, supra note 4, § 104B[a], at 703.
277 See id. at 703-04.
278 See id. at 703; see also W.VA. CODE § 33-13-4 (1999) (applies only to life insurance).
279 See JERRY, supra note 4, § 104B[a], at 703 (The incontestability clause bars an insurer from con-
testing the policy's validity. It cannot, however, bar insurer coverage defenses).
280 See id.
281 See JERRY, supra note 4, § 104B[b][21, at 705-06.
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tion, has proven difficult to apply, particularly in the context of group insurance.
282
The difficulty is especially prevalent in the group context because, arguably, "[t]o
ascertain whether a person is insured necessitates a determination of whether he is
in fact a member of the class" of the "collection of unnamed persons" for whom
insurance is provided under the policy.28 Thus, information provided by the em-
ployer or employee in regard to satisfaction of class criteria (coverage) "tends to
become intertwined with [questions related to misrepresentation.],284 The result
has been a split of authority as to whether misrepresentations as to eligibility in the
application for insurance are coverage defenses or validity defenses.28a
It has been suggested, however, that the difficulty created by the validity
vs. coverage distinction could be avoided through a policy-directed approach. This
approach recognizes that the incontestability clause stands "as a bulwark against
the effects of unreasonable post-claim underwriting.,' 28 6 As such, it is argued, the
policy-directed approach sets forth a more reasoned and pragmatic premise from
which to commence analysis.287 Under this construct, the appropriate inquiry is
whether the policy provision relied upon by the insurer, in asserting the defense,
"functions as a device for post-claim underwriting in a setting in which pre-
issuance underwriting would provide a workable alternative. 2 88 Given this analy-
sis, it is not surprising that courts, in raising the incontestability clause as a bar to
the misrepresentation defense, have implicitly condemned the practice of post
claim underwriting.
This implicit condemnation of post claim underwriting is illustrated by a
recent California case in which the insured sent an imposter to a medical examina-
tion to give blood and urine samples in an effort to hide his HIV infection.2 89 The
imposter, however, as reflected in the medical examination report, was four inches
taller and thirty pounds heavier than.the insured.2 90 In addition, the signature of the
282 See id. at 706.
283 Crawford v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States, 305 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ill. 1973).
284 Id
285 Compare Crawford, 305 N.E.2d 144 (when information as to whether an insured is indeed a
member of the class of those insured under a group policy is furnished by the employer, the question of
coverage is intertwined with the question of whether coverage was obtained by false pretenses) with Simpson
v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 247 N.E.2d 655 (N.Y. 1969) (incontestable clause bars defenses, including
those related to the scope of coverage and risks assumed, if the insurer could have discovered the facts at the
policy's inception). See also Russ, supra note 194, § 8:37 (In many jurisdictions the incontestable clause is
held to prevent claims of ineligibility, but in many others group eligibility requirement defenses are not
barred by the clause. The rationale for allowing the defense is that the policy presupposes the eligibility
criteria; therefore, the failure to satisfy such criteria renders the policy void ab initio).
286 Works, Coverage Clauses, supra note 69, at 813.
287 See id.
288 Id.
289 See Amex Life Assurance Co. v. Superior Court, 930 P.2d 1264 (Cal. 1997).
290 See id. at 1266.
2000]
43
Cady and Gates: Post Claim Underwriting
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2000
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
imposter "[was] transparently different" from that of the insured.29' Therefore, the
insurer had sufficient information before issuance of the policy to alert it to fraud.
The insurer, however, failed to investigate until after a claim for life insurance pro-
ceeds was made by the beneficiaries.
The California Supreme Court rejected the insurer's "imposter defense"
and concluded that its affirmative defense of fraud could not be asserted beyond the
two-year period provided by the incontestability clause. The court reached this
conclusion because "[t]he incontestability clause requires the insurer to investigate
fraud before it issues the policy or within two years afterwards., 293 In this regard,
the court noted that the insurer did nothing to protect its interests but collect premi-
ums until the insured died.294 In addition, the insurer could have protected its inter-
ests, prior to inception of the policy, by the simple expedient of requesting identifi-
cation at the medical examination.295 Thus, an "insurer may not accept the premi-
ums for two years and investigate a possible defense only after the beneficiaries file
a claim,, 296 and subsequently seek to avoid the prohibitions of the incontestability
clause by averring fraud at the policy's inception.
In the course of arriving at its holding, the court expressly acknowledged
the insured's fraudulent conduct as abhorrent.297 Nonetheless, it focused its analysis
on the insurer's conduct instead of the insured and recognized that the purpose of
the incontestability clause is to encourage the insurer to be diligent in its obligation
to investigate the risk within a reasonable time. In the court's words:
[Incontestability] clauses are designed to require the insurer to in-
vestigate and act with reasonable promptness if it wishes to deny
liability on the ground of false representation or warranty by the
insured. It prevents an insurer from lulling the insured, by inac-
tion, into fancied security during the time when the facts could
best be ascertained and proved, only to litigate them belatedly,
291 Id. at 1271.
292 See Amex Life, 930 P.2d at 1271. The imposter defense allows an insurer to avoid the prohibitions
of the incontestability clause because "where a man, pretending to be someone else, goes in person to another
and induces him to make a contract, the resulting contract is with the person actually seen and dealt with and
not with the person whose name was used." Id. at 1269. The imposter defense could not, in Amex Life, defeat
the provisions of the incontestability clause, however, because the insured, himself, applied for coverage with
the insurer and utilized the services of the imposter only for the purposes of the medical examination. There-
fore, the court concluded, a contract was formed through mutual assent of the parties. Thus, the insurer could
only rely upon the affirmative defense of fraud in its efforts to avoid its obligations under the insurance con-
tract. Id. at 1271.
293 Id.
294 See id.
295 See Amex Life, 930 P.2d at 1272.
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possibly after the death of the insured.29
Therefore, even though dishonest people are given advantage by the incontestabil-
ity clause - an advantage that "any right-minded man is loath to see" 299 - "the
sense of security given to the great majority of honest policyholders, 300 by the
clause outweighs the cost occasioned by the actions of a few dishonest persons.3 1
Thus, the incontestability clause may serve to prevent the practice of post
claim underwriting if engaged in by an insurer after the expiration of the time es-
tablished by the policy or statute. The clause, however, cannot dissuade insurers
from engaging in the practice if claims are submitted during the time in which va-
lidity of the policy may be contested. Nor can it protect insureds from the opportun-
istic conduct of insurers if the policy does not contain such a clause or there is no
statutory mandate. Finally, the clause cannot fully protect insureds in those jurisdic-
tions in which a challenge to eligibility for group insurance is not barred by the
clause." 2
L Redux
Although all of the doctrines discussed supra03 have afforded relief to in-
dividual insureds victimized by post claim underwriting (with the possible excep-
tion of the incontestability clause), 304 each requires a factual inquiry qn a case-by-
case basis. The consequences of this ad hoc analysis are two-fold.
First, there is a decided lack of uniformity of opinion regarding the oppor-
tunistic nature of post claim underwriting, despite the clear policy rationales for its
eradication.05 Second, because none of the doctrines unconditionally forecloses an
insurer's reliance upon rescission as a defense, an insurer is reinforced in its deci-
sion to continue to play the odds on bad risks, mindful that it may avoid its market-
ing decision to forego underwriting by pointing to an insured's misrepresentation.
The result - there is currently no doctrine to dissuade insurers from engaging in
298 Id. at 1267 (citing Russ, supra note 194, § 72.2).
299 Id at 1269.
300 Amex Life, 930 P.2d at 1269.
301 See id
302 See Krauss v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 700 F.2d 870, 872 (2d Cir. 1983) (under Illinois
law the incontestability clause does not bar the insurer from raising ineligibility as a special defense).
303 Waiver, estoppel, unconscionability, reasonable expectations, cause of action for statutory unfair
settlement practices, insurer fraud, agent misrepresentation in the application for insurance, and incontestabil-
ity.
304 The incontestability clause is ostensibly a bright-line rule. However, because courts have muddied
the distinction between challenges based upon validity and coverage, its application does not always result in
a bar to claims of fraud. In addition, at least one court has held that the incontestability clause does not bar an
insurer's inception defense based upon fraud. See Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. Haas, 644 A.2d 1098 (N.J.
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opportunistic post claim underwriting. By contrast, a per se rule of bad faith com-
bined with Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 172 forecloses the misrepre-
sentation defense and thereby removes the impetus for the insurer to engage in post
claim underwriting.
VI. ARGUMENTS CONTRA - THE LIAR, THE CUNNING FRAUD, AND THE INNOCENT
MIS-INFORMER
A. The Cases
As previously noted, no formal doctrinal approach to post claim underwrit-
ing has developed.06 Thus, judicial analysis of the practice has been less than uni-
form. More importantly, because a fully developed approach has not been forth-
coming, courts encountering the practice have either endeavored to distinguish
clear incidences of post claim underwriting by giving exceptionally narrow con-
structions to those cases that have provided individual relief to insureds or simply
denied that the practice is one in which insurers engage in bad faith.
Both analyses have been employed in an effort to avoid giving an osten-
sive advantage to insureds alleged to have lied.307 Such constructions, however,
have generally led to absurd and illogical legal analyses. More importantly, as
demonstrated by the spectrum of alleged misrepresentations found within the three
cases discussed, infra, judicial approaches that do not first hold the insurer ac-
countable for its underwriting conduct, sweep within their ambit the innocent mis-
informer. An intermediate Arkansas appellate court opinion well illustrates the
plight of an insured who innocently fails to disclose a non-impairing medical con-
dition, in the absence of a per se doctrine designed to deter post claim underwrit-
ing.308
1. Richison v. Boatmen's Arkansas, Inc.30 9
At issue was the insurer's refusal to pay the policy proceeds of a $2500
credit life insurance policy issued in connection with the purchase of a used pick-up
truck.310 The insurer's application for this coverage required only a general state-
ment of good health. That statement, in its entirety, consisted of the following: "I
am now in good health, mentally and physically; I know of no physical impairment
306 See supra Part V.
307 Courts are loath to see dishonest people given an advantage by judicial doctrine. Thus, in the
context of the lying insured, it is difficult for a court to endorse coverage for such an individual. However, as
with the incontestability clause, courts must focus attention on the insurer's conduct and recognize that the
purpose of a prohibition against post claim underwriting is to encourage the insurer to be diligent in its obli-
gation to investigate the risk before issuance of the policy. See Amex Life Assurance Co. v. Superior Court,
930 P.2d 1264, 1271 (Cal. 1997).
308 See Richison v. Boatmen's Arkansas, Inc., 981 S.W.2d 112 (Ark. Ct. App. 1998).
309 Id.
310 See id. at 113.
[Vol. 102:809
46
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 102, Iss. 4 [2000], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol102/iss4/5
POST CLAIM UNDERWRITING
or disease now affecting my health, 31' No details were requested concerning the
insured's health. 12
The insured was an asthmatic. He was not, however, impaired by this con-
dition. In addition, aside from periodic visits to a physician for prescription refills,
he had not sought treatment of his asthma in over four years.313 It is reasonable to
infer from these facts that the insured believed himself to be in good health and
unaffected by any disease that might adversely impact upon his health.
The insured "died as a result of a fatal asthmatic reaction to the drug Tora-
dol, that was prescribed by his dentist during root canal treatments. '314 His widow
filed a claim with the insurer seeking the policy proceeds. 315 After the claim was
filed, the insurer commenced its underwriting investigation.316 Upon discovering
the insured had asthma, it denied the claim on the grounds of a misrepresenta-
tion.317 The insurer claimed that had the insured "indicated that he suffered from
asthma, [it] would have denied coverage.
318
The insured's widow challenged the policy rescission, arguing that because
the insurer had engaged in post claim underwriting it had, prima facie, acted in bad
faith.319 The court of appeals rejected this argument, holding that "[t]he elements
for recovery under the tort of bad faith require the establishment of affirmative
misconduct by an insurer."'3 20 Under Arkansas law, concluded the court, a failure to
investigate, alone, could never support a claim of bad faith because a failure to
investigate does not involve any affirmative conduct taken by the insurer.321 Af-
firmative conduct, said the court, is evidenced by actions such as, altering insurance
records, actively lying about available coverage, or actively concealing an insured's
coverage.32
In requiring an affirmative act of bad faith, however, the appellate court
misconstrued the duty of good faith as set forth in Restatement (second) of Con-
311 Id.
312 See id.
313 See Richison, 981 S.W.2d at 113.
314 See id. It should be noted that under Arkansas law, had the insured died of a cause other than an
asthmatic reaction, the insurer would not have been able to raise this alleged misrepresentation. Arkansas is
one of a minority of jurisdictions that require a causal connection between any alleged misrepresentation and
the claimed loss to support the defense. Schuman, supra note 70, at 232.
315 See Richison, 981 S.W.2d at 113.
316 See id.
317 See id.
318 Id. at 114.
319 See k!
320 Richison, 981 S.W.2d at 114.
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tracts Section 205 - the cornerstone of the doctrine of bad faith in insurance law.Y
The commentary to Section 205 instructs that "bad faith may be overt or consist of
inaction, and fair dealing may require more than honesty. 324 In light of the Re-
statement explanation, there can be little doubt that the appellate court's primary
premise for refusing to recognize post claim underwriting as per se bad faith is
misplaced. There is no doctrinal support for a requirement that an insurer must
engage in an affirmative act of bad faith before it can be held liable in tort.
More importantly, in erroneously focusing on the Chimera of action versus
inaction, the appellate court abdicated its primary obligation to deter opportunistic
breaches of contractual obligations. Recall that "the fundamental function of con-
tract law ... is to deter people from behaving opportunistically toward their con-
tracting parties., 325 Thus, at its core, good faith performance means not trying "to
take advantage of the vulnerabilities created by the sequential character of contrac-
tual performance. '' 326 Therefore, a party to a contract behaves opportunistically and
in bad faith when it takes advantage of the sequential character of performance
under a contract. The record evidence, as reported by the appellate court, reveals
that the insurer acted in bad faith because it sought to avoid performance by taking
just such an advantage.
According to the testimony of its own underwriter, the insurer had no writ-
ten underwriting policy related to asthma.327 More tellingly, the underwriter testi-
fied that he knew of no applications for insurance rejected by the insurer, as a bad
risk, because the applicant was an asthmatic.328 Thus, there was absolutely no
credible evidence of record to support a conclusion that the insurer would have
refused to underwrite any risk created by asthma, even if its underwriting practices
had been reasonable and not confined to the cursory general good health question-
naire.
Given the underwriter's testimony, there can be no question that the in-
surer engaged in post claim underwriting for the sole purpose of taking advantage
of the insured's beneficiary. Furthermore, such advantage would not have been
possible but for the sequential character of the insurance contract. Thus, the insurer
acted in bad faith, and the insured's beneficiary should have had available an ade-
quate remedy for the breach. By not recognizing a cause of action for post claim
underwriting, the appellate court clearly failed in its duty to deter opportunistic
conduct in contractual relationships.
The same abdication of the judicial imperative to deter opportunistic con-
duct in contractual relationships is apparent in an Illinois appellate court deci-
323 See discussion supra Part IV.A.2. (bad faith).
324 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205, cmt. d (1979).
325 See POSNER, supra note 1, § 4.1.
328 See id.
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sion.32 There, despite the manifest absence of any evidence establishing the in-
sured as the author of the misrepresentation at issue and the insurer's obvious reli-
ance upon post claim underwriting, the court foreclosed relief to the insured.
2. Brandt v. Time Insurance Co.330
An insured was denied health insurance coverage, ostensibly because a
preexisting condition (diabetes) was not disclosed on the application for insur-
ance.331 It was undisputed that the application was completed by a broker with
knowledge of the preexisting condition, on behalf of the insured.3 2 Moreover, the
insured never saw the application completed by the broker until the insurer sought
rescission of the policy.'
Approximately five months after the policy was issued, the insured was di-
agnosed with terminal stomach cancer.3m After a claim for medical benefits was
made and before paying the contracted-for medical costs incurred in connection
with this disease, the insurer undertook an investigation of the insured's medical
history. This investigation revealed that the insured had been treated for diabetes
within five years of her application for coverage.33 5 The insurer, thereafter, sought
rescission of the policy on the basis of a misrepresentation. 3 6
The insured challenged the policy rescission, averring that post claim un-
derwriting "constituted common law fraud.., and an unfair and deceptive trade
practice under the [state] Consumer Fraud Act."" 7 The appeals court rejected this
argument, holding that "Illinois law imposes no duty on an insurer to conduct an
independent investigation of insurability before issuing an insurance policy."
This holding clearly opens all insureds within Illinois to opportunistic manipula-
tions of the aleatory contract of insurance.
Recall that if an "insurer can perpetually postpone the investigation of in-
surability and concurrently retain its right to rescind" until after a claim has been
made, then an insurer can accept premiums, deal with the insured as if there is cov-
erage, lead the insured to believe that he is covered, and never take on the risk that
329 See Brandt v. Time Ins. Co., 704 N.E.2d 843 (111. App. Ct. 1998).
330 Id.
331 See id at 845. The application contained the following question, answered negatively by the
broker. "Within the last five years, have you.., ever received any medical or surgical diagnosis or treatment
including medication for... diabetes?" The plaintiff had a seven-year history of diabetes at the time of
application. Id
332 See id
333 See Brandt, 704 N.E.2d at 845.
334 See id
335 See id
336 See U at846.
337 Id.
338 Brandt, 704 N.E.2d at 846.
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is inherent to the business of insurance.3 39 The "no investigation rule" of the Illi-
nois court thus permits insurers to defeat the very nature of the aleatory contract of
insurance. Furthermore, given sufficient impetus - such as chronic illness - it is
likely that any health insurer will be able to find some detail within an insured's
medical history that, post hoc, amounts to misrepresentation.
In addition, because the insurer has dealt with the insured as if there is
coverage, the insured has stopped seeking additional sources of insurance. Recall
that an insurer must do its investigation before issuance of the policy to allow "the
proposed insured to seek other coverage with another company [in the event of
rejection] since no company will insure an individual who has suffered serious
illness or injury." 34 0 This rationale is particularly pertinent to the Illinois appellate
court's opinion, because no health insurer would provide coverage for an individual
with terminal stomach cancer. However, some insurers might provide coverage to a
diabetic. Therefore, if the reasonable expectations of the insured are to be protected
from opportunistic manipulation of the insurance relationship, then the insurer must
be held to a duty of investigation before issuance of a policy, or at the very least
before a claim is filed. The Illinois appellate court's reasoning is, thus, clearly
faulty.
As discussed, supra, courts, in addition to simply denying that post claim
underwriting constitutes bad faith, have endeavored to artificially distinguish the
practice by simply applying a new moniker. A federal district court opinion, apply-
ing Mississippi law, well illustrates this artificial distinguishment.3 4' In addition,
the case brings to the fore an alleged outright lie that, but for post claim underwrit-
ing, would readily have been discovered pre-issuance.
3. Wesley v. Union National Life
34 2
Plaintiff, the beneficiary of her son's life insurance policy, brought suit
against the insurer after it rescinded the policy, claiming a misrepresentation.34 In
her cause of action, plaintiff alleged the insurer violated Mississippi law by engag-
ing in post claim underwriting. 3"
The policy the plaintiff sought to enforce was taken out on May 11, 1992,
and provided for $10,000 in whole life benefits. 345 An additional $ 10,000 was
payable in the event of an "accidental" or "unnatural death.
34 6
339 Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 456 P.2d 674, 682 (Cal. 1969).
340 Lewis v. Equity Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 637 So. 2d 183, 189 (Miss. 1994).
341 Wesley v. Union Nat'l Life, 919 F. Supp. 232 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
342 Id.
343 See id. at 233.
344 See id.
345 See id.
346 Wesley, 919 F. Supp. at 233.
[Vol. 102:809
50
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 102, Iss. 4 [2000], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol102/iss4/5
POST CLAIM UNDERWRITING
Plaintiff's son was shot and killed on June 21,1992.347 An autopsy was per-
formed and the presence of cocaine was detected in the blood work.a48 Only after
learning of the insured's death did the insurer "beg[i]n to investigate whether [his]
answers on the application [for insurance] were truthful." 349 In the course of this
post claim underwriting, the insurer discovered that its insured "had been confined
to a chemical dependency unit at a hospital in California due to cocaine addic-
tion."35 Based upon this post claim underwriting information, the insurer averred
its insured, plaintiff's son, lied in the application process because the application
did not disclose the cocaine use and substance abuse hospitalization. 351
In addressing plaintiff's claim: that the insurer should be prohibited from
rescinding the policy because it had engaged in post claim underwriting, the district
court correctly defined the practice as "an insurer's waiting until after the insured
makes a claim to determine whether the claimant is eligible for insurance according
to the risks he presents., 35 2 The court also acknowledged the Mississippi Supreme
Court's condemnation of the practice with a direct quote from the leading post
claim underwriting case: "an insurer has an obligation to its insureds to do its un-
derwriting at the time a policy application is made, not after a claim is filed.,
353
The district court, however, sought to circumvent the clear meaning of that admoni-
tion by endeavoring to draw an ersatz distinction between post claim underwriting
of eligibility and post claim investigation of eligibility. 354 This fallacious distinction
in terminology, in turn, prompted the court to declare that the insured, through ly-
ing, had bypassed the insurer's legitimate underwriting process.
The district court's distinction is one without a difference and is a legal
hair that cannot be split. Both post claim underwriting and the newly created "post
claim investigation of eligibility" determine eligibility after a claim has been filed.
The district court, nonetheless, attempted to drive a wedge between the two by
maintaining that the insurer met its underwriting obligations through the simple
expedient of an application questionnaire. In the district court's words, "[t]he ques-
tions on the insurance application were one method for screening out applicants





351 Three questions on the policy application were answered falsely. The responses to these three
questions "indicated that the [insured] had not been hospitalized in the past five years, that he had not used
cocaine or heroin within the past three years and that he had not consulted a physician within the past three
years." Wesley, 919 F. Supp. at 233.
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decision not to insure applicants who answered yes" to the relevant questions on
the application questionnaire. 3  Therefore, concluded the district court, propter
hoc, it was the insured, not the insurer, who "bypassed" the underwriting proc-
ess.
3 57
The error in the district court's analysis is its failure to fully consider the
legal ramifications of that very underwriting decision by the defendant insurer.
Recall that decisions as to the extent of pre-issuance underwriting are primarily a
marketing choice. Insurers can "decide whether to investigate their applicants at
the beginning, in which case they will accept fewer applications but also insure
better risks, or increase sales by simplifying their underwriting requirements at the
time of purchase and risk adverse selection." 35 8 Thus, the district court, in attempt-
ing to distinguish between post claim underwriting and, so-called, "post claim in-
vestigation of eligibility," failed to hold the insurer accountable for its marketing
decision. That decision not to investigate naturally resulted in adverse selection of
insureds - including those who lie.359 In other words, reasonable underwriting prac-
tices by the defendant insurer would have prevented any alleged "lying bypass."
More particularly, the facts as reported in the opinion do not indicate that
the defendant insurer came to learn of the insured's "confine[ment] in a chemical
dependency unit" from sources outside the chain of its application process.360
Therefore, more likely than not, the insurer had the means available to ascertain
information rendering the insured ineligible for coverage before issuance of the
policy, but chose not to expend the monies necessary to effectuate those means.
Thus, the insurer chose to receive the income generated by the insured's question-
able policy with knowledge that at a later date, should it be faced with a covered
loss, it would raise any inaccuracies in the application to avoid paying the policy
proceeds.
Unfortunately, the district court, in focusing on the allegations of the indi-
vidual insured's dishonesty, lost sight of the insurer's bad faith stratagem.36' As a
consequence, the district court granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment,
concluding that it "properly rescinded the insurance contract because of the mate-
rial misrepresentations . . . on the application for insurance. ' 362 This holding is,
356 Wesley, 919 F. Supp. at 235.
Id.
358 See Schuman, supra note 70, at 226.
359 It is important to note, however, that because the Wesley insured was deceased, there is no way to
determine whether the answers on the insurance application were in fact his lies. In this regard, note that the
district court indicated only that the insured signed the application form. See Wesley, 919 F. Supp. at 233.
There is absent from the statement of facts any assertion that the Wesley insured actually completed the appli-
cation. See id. Thus, the answers on the insurance application could have been those of the insurer's agent.
See also discussion supra Part V.G. The Wesley beneficiary would, of course, be at a considerable disadvan-
tage in proving any agent misstatements because only her deceased son would have the requisite first hand
knowledge to support such an assertion.
360 Wesley, 919 F. Supp. at 233.
361 See discussion supra Part IV.
362 Wesley, 919 F. Supp. at 235.
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obviously, in direct contravention of Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section
172. 36 Had the district court properly focused first on the bad faith stratagem of
post claim underwriting, it would have found the insurer's reliance upon misrepre-
sentation as a defense, unjustified. Such reliance was unjustified because any al-
leged misrepresentation by the insured in the application was not discovered before
issuance only because of the insurer's own bad faith reliance upon the practice of
post claim underwriting. 36 Finally, as discussed more fully, infra, it is appropriate
to hold the insurer responsible for its decision to post claim underwrite because the
alleged cunning fraud, now deceased, cannot rebut the allegation.
4. Redux
The three cases (Richison,3s Brand 66 and Wesley3 67) illustrate much more
than the failure of courts to apply sensible legal analyses and policy rationales.
More fundamentally, these cases demonstrate a spectrum, or continuum, of alleged
insured misrepresentations and concomitant levels of arguable culpability for that
misinformation. This spectrum, in turn, reveals just how facilely the innocent mis-
informer is swept within the ambit of doctrinal approaches that respond viscerally
to allegations of lies and fraud, and as a consequence, fail first to assess the in-
surer's underwriting conduct.
Few reasonable persons could argue that Mr. Richison's affirmative re-
sponse to the general statement of good health in his application for credit life in-
surance was made with the intent to misinform the insurer.36 This view is consis-
tent with the conclusion reached by the majority of courts that responses to general
good health questions are statements of subjective opinion.369 Mr. Richison, more
likely than not, genuinely believed that he was in good health and that his asthma
was not "indicative of a lack of good health." 370 Thus, his response to the insurer's
cursory general good health inquiry was likely truthful. Therefore, Mr: Richison's
conduct should not be viewed as the cause of any alleged mistaken decision to un-
derwrite the risk he presented. As such, Mr. Richison characterizes the quintessen-
tial innocent mis-informer, wrongly denied coverage for which he bargained be-
cause the court failedfirst to assess the underwriting conduct of the insurer.
Standing in direct contrast to the absence of a causative nexus within Mr.
Richison's conduct is the Richison insurer's post claim underwriting scheme. It was
this scheme that caused the insurer to underwrite a risk that post hoc was declared
363 See discussion supra Part IV.
3 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONTRACTS § 172(1981).
365 Richison v. Boatmen's Arkansas, Inc., 981 S.W.2d 112 (Ark. Ct App. 1998).
366 Brandt v. Time Ins. Co., 704 N.E.2d 843 (111. App. Ct. 1998).
36 Wesley, 919 F. Supp. 232.
36 See Richison, 981 S.W.2d at 113.
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erroneous. Had the insurer expended the time and monies necessary to investigate
Mr. Richison's medical history, it would have discovered that he suffered from
asthma. Then, in the event the insurer determined that asthma was not a risk it
wished to embrace, it could refuse to extend coverage before policy issuance.
Ms. Brandt's alleged misrepresentation is conducive to similar analysis.
Ms. Brandt did not lie; the broker lied.371 As such, Ms. Brandt should not be seen as
the cause of any alleged, erroneous underwriting decision.
The broker, of course, was likely compensated for his services through
commissions paid by the insurer. 2 Commissions are, naturally, not earned if a
policy is not issued. Thus, the broker confronted a manifest temptation to misin-
form in order to sell the policy and procure his commission.7 3 The Brandt insurer
was likely well aware of this temptation.374 Nonetheless, it made a reasoned deci-
sion to ignore the potential for misinformation, built into the process of remunera-
tion, and relied instead upon a scheme of post claim underwriting to avoid contract
performance, in the event a broker lied. Therefore, just as in Richison, it was reli-
ance upon post claim underwriting that caused the insurer to make an impoverished
underwriting decision, not the insured.
The reader may now exclaim, "Ok, I can accept that Richison and Brandt
were innocent mis-informers; they should have been afforded the benefit of their
bargain. But what about Wesley? He was clearly a cunning fraud!" In response to
that exclamation we posit, "Maybe, but we don't really know."
The difficulty created in Wesley through absolution of the insurer's mar-
keting decision to engage in post claim underwriting arises from the distinct possi-
bility that he, like Ms. Brandt, was the victim of misstatements in the application
prepared by the insurer's agent. 75 Because Wesley was dead, the court could not be
advised of the true circumstances associated with his insurance application. 37 6 The
court, however, did know that the insurer engaged in post claim underwriting.
3 r7
More importantly, the Wesley facts support a conclusion that, but for the insurer's
371 "The relationship between most brokers and the insurance companies they place coverages with
typically involves significantly greater ongoing contacts and interactions than the relationship with any indi-
vidual applicant for insurance or insured. Accordingly, so long as the general rule prevails that an agent may
not serve two principles simultaneously, it seems clear that in most contexts there is more justification for
treating a broker as an agent of an insurer than as an agent for the purchaser." KEETON & WIDISS, supra note
23, § 2.5(b)(3), at 84.
372 See id.
373 There can be no question that the broker knew that Ms. Brandt was a diabetic. He previously
procured two short-term medical insurance policies for her that excluded the diabetes from coverage as a pre-
existing condition. Brandt v. Time Ins. Co., 704 N.E.2d 843, 845 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
374 See National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Miller, 484 So. 2d 329, 339 (Miss. 1985) (Hawkins, J.,
concurring), as discussed supra Part III.D.
375 See discussion supra Part V.G.
376 This difficulty of proof, faced by the beneficiaries of deceased insureds such as Mrs. Wesley,
when an insurer raises an inception defense, provides the primary rationale for the incontestability clause. See
JERRY, supra note 4, § 104B, at 703, 707-09; see also discussion infra Part VI.B.
377 Wesley v. Union Nat'l Life, 919 F. Supp. 232, 235 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
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reliance upon post claim underwriting, the insurer, through reasonably thorough
underwriting, would have discovered that Wesley had undergone treatment for
substance abuse in the past.378 Had it done so, the adverse risk it sought to throw off
post hoc could have been avoided pre-issuance.
Thus, this tripartite of contra-cases actually instructs that the dividing line
between the innocent mis-informer, the liar, and the cunning fraud is not so brightly
drawn as visceral responses might indicate. Given this absence of clear delineation,
courts shouldfirst look to the insurer's conduct so as to ascertain its true underwrit-
ing decision. It may well be that the insurer, implicitly, through a reasoned market-
ing decision, chose to insure not only the innocent mis-informer but the liar and the
cunning fraud as well. Thus, insurers who have made such perilous underwriting
decisions should not be protected when it is impossible to distinguish with certainty
between the innocent insured and the cunning fraud.
B. The Literature
Courts are not the only source of legal analysis to erroneously abandon the
directive to deter opportunistic conduct after having been blinded by a visceral
response to allegations of misrepresentation and fraud. Some in the academic
community decry a phantasmic plague of insured fraud and consequently seek its
eradication at virtually any cost. Robert R. Googins is representative of this school
of thought. 79
1. Googins
In a 1996 article in the Connecticut Insurance Law Journal, Robert R.
Googins posits that "the legitimate purpose of the incontestable clause can be hon-
ored without payment to cunning frauds." 0 He reaches this conclusion through the
vehicle of Paul Revere Life Insurance Co. v. Haas, 38 a New Jersey Supreme Court
opinion holding that despite an insurer's obvious marketing choice to reject a statu-
torily provided clause "that would have allowed the perpetual contestability of the
contract as to any fraudulent misstatements made in the [insurance] application," 2
an insured could not recover disability proceeds "for a disease that he or she inten-
tionally concealed when applying for the policy. ' '383 The New Jersey Supreme
Court reached this conclusion even though the contestability period had expired.'m
Both the New Jersey Supreme Court and Mr. Googins rationalize this
378 See id. at 233.
379 See Robert R. Googins, Fraud and the Incontestable Clause: A Modest Proposal for Change, 2
CONN. INS. L. J. 51, 88 (1996).
380 Id. at 88.
381 644 A-2d 1098 (NJ. 1994).
382 Googins, supra note 379, at 53.
383 Id. at 60, 89 n.39 (citing Haas, 644 A.2d at 1100).
384 See id. at 55.
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holding by averring "that insurance fraud is a problem of 'massive proportions'
that... results in substantial cost to the general public. '385 Both the New Jersey
Supreme Court and Mr. Googins recognize that the holding is ultimately one of
public policy. 386 Thus, in their view, sound public policy necessitates a standard
that would allow any insurer to raise the inception defense of a fraudulent misrep-
resentation without regard to the prohibitions of the incontestability clause and, by
implication, a dearth of underwriting notwithstanding.
Although neither Mr. Googins nor the New Jersey Supreme Court directly
addresses the issue of post claim underwriting, the postulate that insurance fraud
"is a problem of massive proportions" has obvious implication for much of the
reasoning on which this Article is premised. In addition, any discussion of the in-
contestability clause is closely related to post claim underwriting, because the in-
contestability clause is said to be "a bulwark against the effects of unreasonable
post-claim underwriting.,
387
Notably lacking from Mr. Googins's article is any empirical evidence to
support an assertion that individual insureds defraud insurers in massive numbers.
Instead it is reasoned, rather fatuously, that because he has observed that traffic
signal disobedience is tolerated; that more people cheat on their tax returns than
twenty years ago; and, that people call in sick when they want an extra vacation
day, it follows that "little frauds" upon insurers are practiced daily when insureds
apply for insurance or file proofs of loss.388
Mr. Googins attempts to bolster this analysis by asserting that while "no-
body knows for sure" just how frequently individual insureds endeavor to defraud
insurers, "those in the business believe the figure is staggering involving billions of
dollars annually. '38 9 He subsequently cites an unpublished survey of twenty-five of
the largest life insurance companies revealing that, in 1993, $83.3 million in claims
were resisted by insurers on the basis of alleged fraud or misrepresentation with an
additional $95.9 million in such claims still unresolved.390 Googins then concludes,
post hoc ergo propter hoc, that despite the "sparsity of information on the aggre-
gate cost of fraud in connection with individual life, accident and disability insur-
385 Id. at 62. See Schuman, supra note 70, claiming that "insurance fraud has reached epidemic pro-
portions, costing insurers and the public at least $15 billion a year and increasing some policy premiums by as
much as 25 percent." Mr. Schuman, like Googins, provides no reliable statistics in relation to any alleged
fraud by individual insureds. However, unlike Googins, Schuman recognizes that the extent and degree of
underwriting is essentially a marketing decision. See Schuman, supra note 70, at 226.
386 See Googins, supra note 379, at 62.
387 Works, supra note 69, at 813.
388 See Googins, supra note 379, at 74.
Id. at 75.
390 See id. at 51 n.121 (citing Philip E. Stano, Recent Developments in Life and Health Insurance
Fraud Legislation, 1995 ALIC Proc. (1995)).
Of course the large number of claims "resisted" by insurers through reliance upon misrepresenta-
tion provides additional support for the conclusion that courts must be vigilant in ensuring that insurers do not
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ance policies, [t]here is ... nothing to suggest that fraud is not a serious problem in
this area" ;391 therefore, there is a massive fraud problem.
Googins then calls upon the judiciary to combat this phantasmic plague of
fraud with the arsenal of its equity powers - "a system of jurisprudence collateral
to, and in some respects independent of 'law,' the object of which is to render...
justice more complete .... affording relief where the courts of law are incompetentto give it.,,392 Thus, for Googins, the insurer has been so victimized by massive
numbers of cunning, fraud-bent, insureds that only the extraordinary remedies of
equity can save the day.
As for the conduct of insurers, Googins believes that they "do not take
questionable risks up front in hope of catching them during the contestable pe-
riod. '393 Furthermore, "[a]ny allegations of a perverse 'retroactive underwriting'
are without merit"; "whatever underwriting investigation that is going to be done
is done prior to a policy's issuance. ' 394 In addition, he insists that "insurers are
[not] predisposed to assert defenses to avoid otherwise legitimate claims" ' and
such defenses are not relied upon as a "result of some unseemly use of an alleged
marketing advantage. '396 Finally, Googins states that "hopefully... insurers will
not mount post contestable period challenges unless the alleged fraud can be clearly
showii." '3 97 His hopefulness is, for him, apparently sufficient safeguard for innocent
insureds faced with post hoc allegations of misrepresentations.
Googins's supposition that insurers are victims in need of protection from
insureds is, of course, contrary to the generally held notion. For example, although
Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 20539 imposes the duty of good faith
and fair dealing upon each party to a contract, the majority of courts applying its
dictates, in the insurance context, have done so as a "one-way street in favor of the
insured [because] the insured needs protection but the insurer does not."3 99 This
conclusion is consistent both with the lack of empirical evidence of pervasive in-
sured fraud (recognized and ignored by Googins) and with the insurance industry's
history of marketing abuses, particularly in the context of warranties - one of the
"technical defenses" for performance avoidance that initially gave rise to the inclu-
sion of incontestability clauses within policies.
400
Googins, of course, discounts any abusive marketing decisions by the in-
391 Googins, supra note 379, at 77.
392 Id.
393 Id. at 71.
394 Id. at 71-72.
395 Id. at 73.
396 Googins, supra note 379, at 73.
397 Id. at 87.
398 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 205 (1981).
399 JERRY, supra note 4, § 25G[4], at 162.
40D See id. § 104B[a], at 703-04.
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surer. 401 He asserts that it is unlikely that any prospective purchaser of a policy is
thinking about the subtlety of various incontestability clauses at the time of sale. 402
Nor, says he, would a sales agent point out such subtleties at the time of sale. 4m
These assertions naturally beg the question - if there is a choice of alternative in-
contestability clauses provided by statute (as there was in Haas) and one of the
choices allows the insurer perpetual contestability for fraudulent misstatements,
what insurer, absent marketing concerns, would choose a clause that does not allow
the defense? Obviously, insurers do make marketing choices. Therefore, if oppor-
tunistic breaches of the sequential character of the insurance contract are to be
avoided, insurers must be held to the consequences of those marketing choices.
Finally, Googins's bald assertion that insurers do not engage in post claim
underwriting 4°4 is clearly without merit. The survey of cases within this Article
alone is evidence that insurers post claim underwrite. In addition, insurers have
admitted to the practice.405 Moreover, the informal monetary figures offered by
Googins as circumstantial evidence for his assertion that insureds are cunning
frauds,408 more readily transfer to the conclusion that post claim underwriting is
rampant. Contested claims amounting to $95.9 million withheld from individual
insureds by only twenty-five companies asserting inception defenses (both fraud
and misrepresentation) is simply beyond ken.407 This figure is even more shocking
when one recognizes that there is apparently no empirical data to support the asser-
tion of rampant fraud perpetrated by individual insureds against insurance compa-
nies.
The flaw in Googins's policy argument is not, however, restricted to the
paucity of empirical support and his apparent non-recognition of the industry prac-
tice of post claim underwriting. The key defect is, in fact, postulated by Googins
himself when he observes that the "important objective [of protecting innocent
insureds from the consequences of unintentional misrepresentations] does not de-
mand the protection of defrauders unless it is not possible to distinguish the inno-
cent misrepresenter from the deceiver., 40 8 This of course, is the primary rationale
for the protections afforded the insured by the incontestability clause. In other
words, the clause protects the insured from unreasonable post claim underwriting
because it is not always possible to differentiate between the innocent insured and
the cunning fraud. As Jerry has noted,
Incontestability clauses first appeared ... in the late nineteenth
401 See Googins, supra note 379, at 72.
402 See id. at 73.
403 See id.
404 See id. at 86-88.
405 See, e.g., Meyer v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Minnesota, 500 N.W.2d 150, 153 (Minn. 1990).
406 See discussion supra note 390.
407 See discussion supra note 390.
408 Googins, supra note 379, at 74 (emphasis added).
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century. In an era where the public's perception of insurers was
particularly negative and it was widely assumed, with some justi-
fication, that insurers would seek to escape their obligations
through the assertion of technical defenses, insurers created the
clause to help dispel the general public's fear that insurers would
refuse to pay death benefits under life insurance policy due to the
insured's errors in the application. If an insurer should decline to
pay a death claim, the danger to the insured's beneficiaries was
obvious; the insured would not be available to testify about the
application, which may have been submitted many years earlier. 9
Thus, because there is considerable danger that an innocent insured's bene-
ficiaries would be denied coverage and find themselves unable to contest that de-
nial because their primary witness is dead, the clause requires the insurer to com-
plete its investigation of the risk before its expiration.410 The clause, therefore, pro-
vides the insured with the security and peace of mind for which he had bargained in
seeking coverage "by preventing the insurer from lulling the insured, by inaction,
into fancied security.'
411
The same rationale transfers with ease to the doctrine set forth within this
Article. Insurers engaged in post claim underwriting, like their brethren at the turn
of the century, seek to assert technical defenses to avoid contract performance.
Thus, the insurer "instead of looking to pay the claim [for the loss incurred by the
insured]" - as promised under the terms of the insurance contract - "look[s] for all
the things in the application that [it] might be able to dig up that would allow [it] to
rescind the policy. ' 412 The insured, however, ignorant of the insurer's intent to
engage in post claim underwriting, goes about his life with the fancied security that
in the event of a loss there will be coverage.
This sense of security, given to the majority of innocent policy holders, is
ample basis upon which to found a public policy rationale for a per se rule of bad
faith in the context of post claim underwriting. Even though some dishonest people
are given advantage under the doctrine -"which any right minded man is loath to
see them get '413 - the honest policyholder should not be put to the trouble and ex-
pense of litigating for coverage for which he contracted, simply because the insurer
made a marketing decision to forego the expense of reasonable underwriting before
issuance of the policy. The great potential for opportunism created by post claim
underwriting far outweighs any cost associated with its prohibition. Therefore, the
assertions of both the New Jersey Supreme Court and Mr. Googins that fraud is
rampant notwithstanding, sound public policy necessitates a per se rule of bad faith
foreclosing reliance upon inception defenses if an insurer has engaged in post claim
409 JERRY, supra note 4, § 104B, at 703.
410 Recall Wesley, as discussed supra Part VI.A.3.
411 Works, supra note 69, at 813.
412 Ingalls v. Paul Revere Ins. Group, 561 N.W.2d 273,285 (N.D. 1997).
413 Amex Life Assurance Co. v. Superior Court, 930 P.2d 1264, 1269 (Cal. 1997).
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underwriting.
2. Redux
Those courts and academics that have focused upon the cunning fraud
have failed to factor in the conduct of the insurer in their calculus. Before assess-
ment of the insured's actions can be made, the nature of the insurer's underwriting,
pre-policy issuance, must be fully ascertained. It is only after such an assessment
that the true nature of the risk taken on by the insurer can be determined. If the
insurer has engaged in underwriting that evidences a desire to "insure the world,"
then the insurer must truly insure the world, cunning fraud and all. The insurer can-
not be permitted to withdraw from that decision in the event of suspected fraud.
Any other conclusion renders the innocent insured victim to the very fraud
the insurer was willing to risk embracing, in the interest of profit and greed. Any
other conclusion wrongly places the mark of judicial imprimatur upon the decid-
edly opportunistic practice of post claim underwriting.
VII. CONCLUSION
The java sipping patrons of Lloyd's Coffee House got it right more than
three centuries ago - all reasonable underwriting is completed pre-issuance, never
post-claim. This traditional sequence of underwriting both permits the insurer to
reduce the risk played by guesswork in assessing the risk it agrees to assume under
the terms of the aleatory contract of insurance and protects the insured's reasonable
expectations of coverage. The traditional sequence of underwriting provides ade-
quate protection for both the insurer and the insured. There is no justification in
policy or law for extending to the insurer the right to invoke an artificial post hoc
mechanism for avoidance of obligations under the aleatory contract of insurance.
By contrast, there is ample support in both policy and law for protection of the in-
sured from the opportunistic practice of post claim underwriting. It is, therefore,
time to sound the judicial death knell for the post claim underwriting bane. A per se
rule of bad faith will fully effectuate that end.
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